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THE ROLE OF FIRMS, BANKS AND BOARDS
How firms, banks and board interact has a significant impact on corporate financing
decisions and performance. In three studies, this dissertation combines studies in economic
history with contemporary research in corporate finance. The first study investigate the
determinants of this bank distress in the Netherlands during the 1920s. During this period
the Dutch economy suffered an unequalled financial crisis. This study finds that during this
time, banks that acquired too much leverage and attracted large quantities of deposits were
more likely to fail.  The investigation showed that international activities increased bankruptcy
risk and that board characteristics, such as interlocking directorates, were important deter -
minants of failure probabilities. The second study takes a long-run perspective and examines
the relation between individual Dutch board members and the outcome of corporate policies
such as dividends, investments and capital structures over the entire twentieth century. The
study shows that individual Dutch directors have significant impact on corporate policies
and performance. Moreover the study identifies individuals with substantial contributions
and provides a historical understanding of the effects these individuals have on corporate
policies. The results show that the directors with the highest systematic relevance for
corporate policies are not by definition those who are most central in the Dutch network.
Rather, these directors have substantial social capital and extensive management expe -
rience. The third study investigates the impact of corporate financial flexibility on dividend
smoothing practices. For large and mature firms dividend payment is still an important
determinant of access to capital markets. As investors aim to generate stable returns, these
firms have the incentive to smooth dividends. This study thus focuses on the interaction
between corporate capital structure choices and dividend smoothing practices. First, the
study documents that firms smooth their dividends more when they are more financially
flexible. Second, the examination shows that firms smooth their dividends more when
agency costs are high and that capital structure choices enable dividend smoothing. The
results  of these studies address different aspects and interactions between firms, banks,
their boards and shareholders.
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- Friedrich August von Hayek (1972) 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
This section provides an overview of the chapters in this dissertation. The chapters are essays on 
financing and performance. The chapters focus on issues currently debated in both the academic 
literature and the practice of financiers and management. Also the chapters focus on issues in 
corporate finance and different types of performance. The second chapter is concerned with the 
causes and consequences of financial crisis for banks and their performance (survival) during times 
of economic turmoil. The third chapter investigates the influence directors may have on firm 
policies and the firms’ performance (return on equity, return on assets and market valuation). The 
fourth chapter focuses on the importance of firm financial flexibility for the dividend decision and 
the firms’ ability to keep dividends stable. 
In the second chapter of this dissertation we investigate the determinants of this bank 
distress in the Netherlands during the 1920s. During this period the Dutch economy suffered an 
unequalled financial crisis. We use discrete choice models to ‘predict the past’. Bank-level 
financial accounting, product market competition and board data included in contemporary 
investor manuals are used to assess how policy decisions influenced banks‘ fate. In particular, we 
ask how banks’ choices made before the debt-deflationary downturn affected their subsequent 
performance in the banking crisis. This chapter complements De Vries (1989) and Jonker and Van 
Zanden (1995) by systematically distinguishing the characteristics of distressed and non-distressed 
banks. This chapter adds a new and more nuanced understanding of this period in Dutch economic 
history. Though we agree that the crisis of the 1920s was caused by extensive deflationary 
pressures, our methodology shows that its consequences for the country’s financial service 
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providers stem from bank-specific risk factors, including the characteristics of their relationships 
with other banks and non-financial firms.  
The main goal of this chapter is to shed new light on an unresolved historical question as 
to what were the key factors causing the 1920s banking crisis. Finding an answer to the role of 
pre-crisis conditions for crisis-period performance is interesting for three further reasons: (1) it 
facilitates the economic identification of the roots of bank distress because this crisis forms a quasi-
natural experiment of history in that its causes were largely exogenous, but its effects on the 
banking sector were partly determined endogenously; (2) because of the absence of prudential 
supervision in the Netherlands at the time of the crisis, this historical episode illustrates how banks 
may behave when there is little expectation of state intervention; and (3) it provides a better 
understanding of product market competitive choice and the workings of relationship banking in 
times of crisis.  
The third chapter of this dissertation investigates the relation between individual Dutch 
directors and the outcome of corporate policies such as dividends, investments and capital 
structures. The goals of this paper are as follows; (1) describe the evolution of big linkers (i.e. 
board members holding three or more board positions); (2) measure the correlation between big 
linkers firm policies and performance; (3) to assess which prominent business men were the most 
important during the twentieth century and describe their profiles. We focus on big linkers since 
the literature has left many questions unanswered regarding the role and power of these directors. 
Are they important because of exceptional skills? Are they too busy to do a good job? Are they 
only well-connected but do they have no effects?  
Building on previous research, such as Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Richardson et al. 
(2004) and Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) we use director fixed effects models to assess the 
7A_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
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systematic relevance of individual big linkers during the twentieth century. An additional product 
of this research is that we demonstrate that large scale quantitative research can be combined with 
in-depth case research, by providing substantial background information on our big linkers. We 
describe the presence of big linkers over time, estimate the systematic relevance of big linkers on 
firm policies and performance, and explain the director effects. The focus on big linkers also has 
a more pragmatic explanation. That is, by examining the similarities of corporate policies across 
firms by looking at big linkers, we solve the difficulty to separate firm and directors effects on 
corporate policies because they are always observed simultaneously.  
The fourth chapter investigates the impact of corporate financial flexibility on dividend 
smoothing practices using recent data for US firms. The literature has focused on three areas of 
market friction to explain the existence and cross-sectional variation of dividend stabilizing 
policies. Information asymmetry between shareholders and managers generates dividend 
smoothing, since managers use their private information to provide information about current and 
future cash flows (Kumar, 1988; Kumar and Lee, 2001; Guttman et al., 2010). Dividend smoothing 
can also arise as a means to limit the agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 
1984; Allen et al., 2000). Alternatively the existence of external finance costs is suggested as a 
driver of dividend smoothing (Miller and Scholes, 1978; Almeida et al., 2004; Aivazian et al., 
2006). We argue that financial flexibility is the missing link in an explanation that consistently 
these integrates market frictions. Following De Jong et al. (2012) and Gamba and Triantis (2008) 
we define financial flexibility as the ability of a firm to fund investments and restructure its 
financing. Recent work by Lambrecht and Myers (2012) provides new insights into the theoretical 
underpinnings of dividend smoothing practices. They show that the smoothing of dividends is 
accomplished through borrowing. In their model payouts can only in part absorb the negative 
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shocks to net income; the remainder must be absorbed by changes in borrowing since investments 
are fixed due to contractual obligations and a finite set of investment opportunities. If debt is to act 
as a shock absorber, the hypothesis is that the firms' dividend smoothing depends on its financial 
flexibility and prior capital structure decisions.  
The main ideas tested in this paper are then as follows. Do firms smooth their dividends in 
the current period in order to preserve low risk debt capacity in order to fund future positive NPV 
projects?. Do firms, conditional on their financial flexibility, attempt to limit external financing 
costs and mitigate agency costs by smoothing their dividends? The contribution of this chapter is 
then threefold. First, this paper provides evidence that financial flexibility is one of the key 
determinants of dividend smoothing. Second, since Lintner (1956) provides little theoretical 
justification for the existence of dividend smoothing, introducing financial flexibility helps to 
formulate an explanation for cross-sectional variation in dividend smoothing using a combination 
of documented market frictions. Third, this paper tests if the firms' capital structure is indeed a 
shock absorber that enables dividend smoothing. 
Finally, the fifth chapter provides concluding remarks, the limitations of my studies, and 
my views on the relationship between research in economic history and research in finance. 
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1.2 Declaration of Contribution 
In this section I declare my contribution to the three studies of this dissertation and acknowledge 
the contribution of other parties where relevant. 
 
Chapter 2 is joint work with Chris Colvin and Abe de Jong. We developed the approach of 
this study together. Joint with student-assistants Kasper Sanderink and Dirk-Jan Sanderink I have 
collected the data for the study. I have executed the analysis. The writing of the paper was a joint 
effort. We jointly discussed the results and robustness of our findings. 
  
Chapter 3 is joint work with Gerarda Westerhuis and Abe de Jong. We developed the 
approach of this study together. With the data we had already collected for the BINT-project, 
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Chapter 4 is single-authored work.  
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Chapter 2 
 
‘Predicting the Past’: Understanding the causes of bank distress in 
the Netherlands in the 1920s1 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Dutch economy suffered a sharp recession in the early 1920s after it had experienced a period 
of exceptional performance in the 1910s. Following Fisher’s (1933) debt-deflation theory of great 
depressions, Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) argue that this recession’s principal cause was over-
indebtedness combined with price deflation. Dutch businesses had benefited greatly from the First 
World War, a conflict in which the Netherlands remained neutral (De Jong, 2005); a short post-
war boom prolonged their prosperity (Van Zanden, 1997a). The large and sustained declines in 
aggregate demand and prices that followed were the consequence of falling export demand and 
monetary policy due to the gold standard. Debt-deflation put pressure both on Dutch businesses 
and on the banking sector that they had come to rely on. Instability for banks has since been widely 
classified as constituting a financial crisis (e.g. Bernanke and James, 1991; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) estimate that 35 banks suffered financial distress in this 
crisis; De Vries (1989) puts the number closer to 70. Of the 142 banks considered in this article, 
which together constitute 83% of the nominal equity value of the Dutch financial services sector, 
we document 33 that suffered distress at some stage in the crisis. This article quantitatively 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on a published paper co-authored by Chris Colvin and Abe de Jong. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the 
Economic History Society Annual Conference (April 2012), the European University Institute (June 2012), Queen’s University Belfast (June 2012), 
the University of Cologne (July 2012), Erasmus University Rotterdam (September 2012), the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the 
Humanities and Social Sciences (June 2013), the University of Cambridge (June 2013) and the European Business History Association Annual 
Congress (September 2013). We thank the organisers and audiences of these gatherings for listening to our ideas. We especially thank Fabio 
Braggion, Carsten Burhop, Joost Jonker, Nathan Marcus, Lars Norden and John Turner for their comments and suggestions on the drafts of this 
chapter, including on a working paper distributed by the European Historical Economics Society (EHES Working Papers in Economic History, No. 
35, January 2013). Finally, we thank Joachim Voth and two anonymous referees for helping us to improve this chapter. Full reference: Colvin, C. 
L., De Jong, A., & Fliers, P. T. (2015). Predicting the past: Understanding the causes of bank distress in the Netherlands in the 1920s. Explorations 
in Economic History, 55, 97-121. 
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investigates the determinants of this unequalled bank distress in the Netherlands by using discrete 
choice models to “predict the past”. Bank-level financial accounting, product market competition 
and board composition data included in popular contemporary investor manuals are used to assess 
how policy decisions influenced banks’ fate. In particular, we ask how banks’ choices made before 
the debt-deflationary downturn affected their subsequent performance in the banking crisis. This 
article complements De Vries (1989) and Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) by systematically 
distinguishing between the characteristics of distressed and non-distressed banks. As such, this 
article adds a new and more nuanced understanding of this period in Dutch economic history. 
Though we agree that the crisis of the 1920s was caused by extensive deflationary pressures, our 
methodology shows that its consequences for the country’s financial service providers stem from 
bank- specific risk factors, including the characteristics of their relationships with other banks and 
non-financial firms. 
While our main goal is to shed new light on an unresolved historical question, finding an 
answer to the role of pre-crisis conditions for crisis-period performance is interesting for three 
further reasons: (1) it facilitates the economic identification of the roots of bank distress because 
its causes were largely exogenous, but its effects on the banking sector were partly determined 
endogenously; (2) because of the absence of prudential supervision in the Netherlands at the time 
of the crisis, this historical episode illustrates how banks may behave when there is little 
expectation of state intervention; and (3) it provides a better understanding of product market 
competitive choice and the workings of relationship banking in times of crisis.  
The methodology that we employ follows work which uses discrete choice models to 
determine why banks fail (Kolari et al., 2002; Ravi Kumar and Ravi, 2007). Following Meyer and 
Pifer (1970), Martin (1977), and Pettway and Sinkey (1980), we use bank- level accounting data 
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to measure capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings and liquidity. Our data on the determinants of 
failure are taken from 1917, while the failures start in 1920. This implies that all decisions were 
taken in 1917 or earlier, but the crisis was caused by the troubles the banks’ clients and business 
connections faced in 1920 and later. All banks in our sample - failing or not - were confronted with 
the same economic conditions, but not all banks failed. Our empirical strategy explores the 
possibility that failing banks made bad lending and financing decisions up to 1917 and suffered 
their consequences in the 1920s. In other words, we document bad policy decisions, conditional 
on changing economic circumstances. Although the precise developments after 1917 were not 
foreseeable for the bankers, those making good decisions anticipated a worsening of conditions. 
In this article we take a broad view of bank distress. We include many of the standard 
balance sheet-based and control variables found in the literature on banking crises. The Dutch 
financial sector was highly fragmented at the time of the crisis and the banks in our sample exhibit 
wide variation in their product market choices and positioning. We incorporate variables which 
describe market structure and the presence of international activities in order to measure these 
effects. Descriptions of the Dutch financial services sector in this period suggest that bank directors 
were positioned strategically on the boards of related financial and non-financial corporations with 
the explicit task of safeguarding their employers’ interests (e.g. De Graaf, 2012). We use 
information from the banks’ boards, and in particular their networks of interlocking directorates, 
to explore the impact of a form of relationship banking that emerged in the Netherlands in the 
1910s. 
Our results are as follows. We find that the balance sheet composition of banks before the 
crisis period had a significant impact on their probability of suffering distress in the 1920s. In 
particular, banks with higher leverage and more deposits were at greater risk of suffering distress. 
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Much in line with the established view of this crisis, we attribute this to the combined exposure to 
debt-deflation - which rendered long-term loans riskier - and the post-war boom that came 
immediately before it - which caused a short-lived banking bubble. We find that younger and 
exchange-listed banks were more vulnerable in times of crisis. 
The effects of banks’ product market strategies and competition are mixed. On the one 
hand, we find that banks with branches and international activities were more likely to suffer 
distress. We take this to be evidence of the risk of doing business further away from banks’ 
headquarters, a strategy which is associated with higher monitoring costs. On the other hand, we 
find no discernible effect of competition, measured as the relative market representation over the 
regions where a bank is active in the domestic market. 
In exploring how interlocking directorates influence banks’ performance, we find that 
banks with smaller boards had a higher probability of suffering distress. When we control for the 
effects of board size and the attributes of interlocking directorates, we find evidence for the 
interdependency of the Netherlands’ banks. In particular, banks which positioned their managerial 
connections in other financial firms that were smaller and more profitable immediately prior to the 
crisis were most at risk. We find that interlocks with non-financial firms had a weak impact on the 
probability of suffering distress; we find only that banks which concentrated such interlocks were 
better able to safeguard their interests during the crisis. 
The findings of this article relate to a wider literature on universal or relationship banking 
in the early twentieth century, in particular to Fohlin (1999) for the case of Germany and to Van 
Overfelt et al. (2009) for the case of Belgium. More specifically, we re-examine the problems 
associated with mixed banking in the crises of the interwar period, much as White (1986) and 
Kroszner and Rajan (1994) do for the case of the US. 
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Our results relate to an already existing body of work on the Dutch crisis of the 1920s. De 
Vries (1989) gives a detailed historical narrative of its unfolding from the perspective of De 
Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), the Netherlands’ bank of issue. Jonker (1989, 1991) argues that close 
ties between bankers and their corporate borrowers via interlocking directorates soon extended the 
crisis from the non-financial to the financial sector. Colvin (2014) describes how conflicts of 
interest arising from one such interlock resulted in the near failure of the country’s second-largest 
bank. We find that the crisis was mainly caused by the internal choices made by banks in terms of 
financial structure (leverage and deposits) and product market strategy (branching and 
internationalization), as well as by the relations between banks. 
This article is closely related to various other works in banking and finance. Most 
importantly, it relates to work on the causes and consequences of financial crises - a theme which, 
given recent bank failures, has lately been revived (for a review, see Acharyaetal., 2009; Lo, 2013). 
Of specific relevance in this literature are two studies which, like ours, attempt to “predict the 
past”: Jordan et al. (2010), who, on the basis of data pertaining to banks one year prior to the 2007 
crisis, predict recent bank failures with 88% accuracy; and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), who find that 
there is a general persistence in banks’ risk-taking culture between 1998 and the present which 
renders their performance very sensitive to crises. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, the historical and institutional context necessary to 
understand our arguments is introduced in Section 2. Our bank-level accounting and corporate 
governance data and the empirical strategy used in the analysis are discussed in Section 3. Section 
4 defines the variables constructed for our regression exercises and presents their descriptive 
statistics, and Section 5 discusses the results of our regression models for bank failure. Section 6 
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concludes by assessing the importance of a bank’s policy decisions, in terms of balance sheet 
composition and interlocking directorates, for its performance during a deflationary recession. 
 
2.2 Historical and institutional context 
At the turn of last century, the Netherlands’ banks played second fiddle to the country’s capital 
markets. Commercial banks were nothing like those in neighbouring Germany (Fohlin, 2007). 
Indeed, the Netherlands went in very little for banking: 64% of the kingdom’s money supply on 
the eve of the First World War was in the form of paper money, versus 37% in Germany, 29% in 
Belgium and just 4% in Britain (Van Zanden, 1997b). Jonker (2002) argues that the Netherlands 
had not produced banks because its sophisticated financial inheritance could do without them. 
Amsterdam’s merchants had developed a flexible credit source called prolongatie, a short-term 
credit instrument which demanded financial securities - primarily exchange-listed shares - as 
collateral. This highly liquid on-call money market, which operated in a similar way to modern 
repurchase agreements (repos), was unique to the Netherlands and outcompeted banks on cost. It 
enabled firms to meet both short-term and long-term credit requirements, since the instrument 
could be easily rolled over. 
From about 1911, and in particular during the First World War, the country started to look 
more like a bank-based economy. A wave of bank mergers had built sophisticated multi-branch 
networks with a wide portfolio of clients (Jonker, 1995). The prolongatie market gave way to bank 
finance when Amsterdam’s stock exchange closed in 1914 due to the outbreak of war (De Vries, 
1976).2 The war itself and the subsequent short post-war economic boom hastened the move by 
banks to widen their services; they now took a direct part in industrial ventures, not merely 
                                                          
2 Although the prolongatie market continued to be used after the war (Euwe, 2010), it never fully recovered. 
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bringing them to market. The regulatory regime at the time remained laissez faire: the absence of 
corporate laws specifically governing banking corporations enabled them to engage in a variety of 
different business activities, including investment banking, without being inhibited by minimum 
bank capitalisation requirements, or constrained by specific shareholder liability rules. Moreover, 
the country lacked a modern central bank; while DNB as the bank of issue monopolised the 
printing of paper money, it remained a private business answerable to private shareholders, had no 
formal duty of regulatory oversight and neither a de facto nor a de jure function as a lender of last 
resort in crises (Jonker, 1996).3 
By tradition, Dutch firms employed a dual board structure similar to the German model, 
with a management board made up of directeuren (executive directors) and a supervisory board of 
commissarissen (nonexecutive directors).4 Jonker (1989, 1991) uses the number of interlocks 
between banks and industry to measure financial development, or banking scope. He argues that 
an increase in interlocks suggests a move towards universal service provision, where banks 
simultaneously do business as both commercial and investment banks, since banks install directors 
in the firms which they finance. He argues that bankers sitting on the boards of multiple firms 
positioned themselves as “bearers of capitalism”, able to control the trajectory of the country’s 
economic development.5 He finds that in the early 1920s interlocks more than doubled, from 200 
in 1920 to 431 in 1923. Many of these were due to changes at the Netherlands’ second-largest 
                                                          
3 However, DNB did supervise the banking sector in three informal ways: (1) its governors were sent news of changes in the board composition of 
all Dutch financial institutions; (2) like other shareholder- owned banks, it actively participated in the corporate policy formation of other firms by 
parachuting its directors onto the boards of corporate clients; and (3) it could choose the financial terms for its short-term debt instrument, access 
to its bill rediscounting facility. The last was especially controversial at the time; some private banks complained that it was abusing its position as 
the Dutch state’s bank of issue by allegedly offering loans at terms that no other bank could match (Communication between the director of the 
Bond Geld- en Effectenhandel and the Minister of Finance, December 1917, Archief van de Bond voor de Geld- en Effectenhandel te ’s-
Gravenhage, Access No. 2.19.042.14, Nationaal Archief, The Hague). 
4 Members of both boards were normally appointed at shareholders’ meetings on the advice of sitting directeuren (De Jong and Roell, 2005); as a 
rule, their appointment could be assumed. 
5 Jonker revisits earlier notions of the relevance of interlocking directorates put forward by Wibaut (1913), who argues that the Netherlands’ largest 
banks were gradually starting to dominate the economy by buying equity stakes in industry and increasing credit supply. Wibaut saw this as a 
conscious strategy by the bankers to strive for hegemony, which led to a prominent role for them in the decision making process of industrial firms. 
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bank, the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging (Robaver): from 20 interlocks in 1910 to 127 in 1923.6 
But the trend included others: De Jong and Roell (2005) find that in 1923 the proportion of non-
financial exchange-listed firms with no bank interlocks was 40%, while 22% had one interlock, 
12% had two, 8% had three and 18% more than three.7 
The structure of Dutch banking had changed quite significantly at the beginning of the 
twentieth century: an increasing trend towards concentration, the market entry of new banks and 
the adoption of a universal banking business model by various incumbents changed the banking 
landscape. However, the scale and scope of the Netherlands’ banks remained highly diverse. 
Although the size of the five largest banks increased in relation to the rest, they by no means 
dominated8; a host of smaller, often specialised, banks co-existed. These included smaller 
algemene banken (general commercial banks),9 which, like Robaver, operated as full-service 
financial firms, but to more limited geographical markets. Other players included private banking 
houses, such as Hope & Co.; unit-independent provincial banks offering a narrower range of 
services, such as bill discounting; and scores of specialist mortgage banks. Cooperative rural banks 
(boerenleenbanken) and banks for small-scale urban enterprises (middenstandsbanken) were 
emerging with the turn of the century.10 In addition a handful of overseas banks operated as free-
standing companies servicing firms in the Dutch colonies and elsewhere. Branching was a 
                                                          
6 This was described on the eve ofthe crisis by the son ofRobaver’s president as part of an expansionary strategy to emulate Germany’s universal 
banks (Westerman, 1920). 
7 Most interlocks were between the supervisory boards of banks and non-financial firms (47%), but a substantial portion involved a directeur of a 
bank sitting as a commissaris of a non-financial firm (29%). 
8 The Netherlands’ Big Five comprised: Amsterdamsche Bank, Incasso-Bank, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, Robaver and Twentsche Bank. 
All five eventually merged into what is now ABN AMRO (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2000). 
9 Such as the Rotterdam-based Marx & Co.’s Bank, and the Amsterdam- based Bank-Associatie and Algemeene Spaar- en Depositobank. 
10 A separate analysis of cooperative banks can be found in Colvin (2011) and Colvin and McLaughlin (2014). 
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relatively new strategy for Dutch banks; about 70% of the banks in our sample were unit-
independent on the eve of the 1920s’ crisis. 
Between 1920 and 1924, De Vries (1989) counts the (near-) failure of at least four 
algemene banken (including Robaver), 26 provincial banks and two overseas ones. He estimates 
that at least 200 million guilders was lost between 1920 and 1922, a figure largely confirmed by 
our research.11 The history of Marx & Co. and Robaver is particularly enlightening: the former for 
DNB's (lack of) involvement when it failed in 1922; the latter for the poisonous relationship 
between the bank and the non-financial firms which it had helped to finance (Colvin, 2014). Jonker 
(1991, 1995) argues that many banks performed badly because they lacked the knowledge and 
experience to finance industries; he finds that close ties between bankers and their borrowers 
worsened the crisis. Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) argue that the 1920s taught bankers that 
management ties carry risks; in the late 1920s, many banks abandoned the very ties that they had 
earlier established to control their financial interests. The sector as a whole was largely able to 
avoid banking failures in the Great Depression of the 1930s, due in no small part to crisis-induced 
consolidation, corporate restructuring and policy changes. 
A major source of the economic decline which acted as the backdrop to the Netherlands' 
1920s crisis was reduced international demand following a global postwar slump. Consumption 
statistics suggest that domestic demand remained quite stable, or even increased (Barro and Ursua, 
2008), and so much of the blame can be put on consumers located in Germany and the UK, the 
Netherlands’ principal export markets. The reason for the Netherlands’ post-war problems was 
therefore largely exogenous. Why was the drop in foreign demand felt so sharply by banks in 
particular? The Netherlands’ interest rate structure (Van der Bie and Smits, 2001) had encouraged 
                                                          
11 This is likely an underestimate of the true damage done: just the 18 banks in our sample which failed outright were valued at 208 million guilders 
immediately prior to the crisis, approximately 1.2 billion euros in today's money. 
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firms to finance their rapid war-time demand-led expansion using short-term rather than long-term 
debt instruments, as the former became relatively cheap (Fig. 1). The type of project that had 
traditionally found long-term financing was now being paid for with riskier short-term debt, which 
then had to be rolled over. When, in the early 1920s, these loans were called in en masse, they 
simply could not be repaid. 
The Netherlands’ 1920s debt-deflationary crisis is best understood in a British mirror, 
where the blame for deflation has been put squarely at the door of monetary policy (Solomou, 
1996). The UK’s large trade deficit and low gold reserves resulted in the formal abandonment of 
gold in March 1919. However, the expectation persisted that policymakers would restore pre-war 
parity as soon as feasible. Although sterling was only officially re-linked to gold in 1925, the 
damage had already been done in the preparation for this return; expectations did all the work 
(Solomou, 1996). The Dutch case differs from Britain’s in that the country had accrued large 
balance of payments surpluses during the war, which had led to a significant increase in gold 
reserves (Boeschoten, 1992) and the overall money supply (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2000) (Fig. 
2). Guilder’s return to gold was coordinated with that of sterling, and the guilder-sterling exchange 
rate was fixed throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century. Economic policies had 
to be coordinated with the hegemon; the decision-making process which led to the deflation was 
determined on Horse Guards Road and Threadneedle Street, not the Kneuterdijk and the Oude 
Turfmarkt. Dutch monetary policy, and thus by extension the decision to embrace a deflationary 
path, was exogenous.12 
                                                          
12 The Dutch commitment to gold was not unusual and must be seen in the context of Eichengreen’s (1992) argument that the interwar gold exchange 
standard was an exercise of blind faith, yearning for the era of pre-war prosperity, or Bordo and Rockoff’s (1996) argument of the gold standard as 
a “good housekeeping seal of approval”, with the Netherlands aligning itself with the region’s geopolitical power for economic reasons. 
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Figure 1: Long and short interest rates, 1900 to 1929. 
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Figure 2: Dutch monetary developments, 1900 to 1929. 
 
2.3 Data and empirical strategy 
The macroeconomic cause of the Dutch crisis is relatively well understood, and so we explore the 
contribution of decisions made at the level of individual banks. We use discrete choice models to 
estimate whether pre-crisis bank-level characteristics can predict crisis performance. Formula 1 
depicts the discrete choice (logistic) model used:13 
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(1) 
                                                          
13 We also estimate linear probability models in order to determine whether imposing assumptions of linearity and normality changes our results. 
We find that they do not. 
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Distress is defined as a binominal variable that takes the value of one if a bank has 
experienced distress during the period 1920 to 1927 and zero otherwise.14 Subsequently ܨ௜ is a 
vector of bank-specific financial characteristics, ܯ ௜ܵ is a vector of bank-specific market structure 
variables and ܫ௜is a vector of bank-specific management and interlock characteristics. Moreover, 
ߝ௜ is the bank-specific prediction error stemming from the choice of regression model and is 
clustered by region and bank type.15 Subsequent regressions report mar- ginal effects at the 
median.16 
We use four sources in the construction of the dependent variable, i.e. the measure of 
distress resolved through liquidation, merger or reorganisation. These sources are: (1) Kramer 
(1928), a PhD dissertation on firm reorganisations during the crisis period; (2) De Vries (1989), 
an official history of DNB in the crisis period, written using the archives of this bank; (3) De 
Nederlandsche Bank (2000), a list of all banks operating in the Netherlands throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and (4) news and commentary from the financial press which 
we compile using an online newspaper database.17  While we find a significant overlap between 
these four sources, we find source (4) to be particularly useful; unlike the others, it enables us to 
systematically search for evidence of distress for all 142 banks in our sample, and it allows us to 
identify those banks that needed to be reorganised financially, but did not exit the market altogether 
                                                          
14 We define three mutually exclusive types of distress: liquidation (including bankruptcy), distressed merger and financial reorganisation. We treat 
these categories as one because we are interested in predicting the incidence of distress rather than the manner in which the distress is resolved. 
15 While the variables chosen in our analysis are generally applicable, there are regional and bank-type differences which may render measurement 
error particular to specific regions or bank types. To facilitate the identification process we therefore limit the correlation of measurement errors to 
the specific region and bank type for which they are relevant using a one-way clustering methodology. This results in the use of twelve potential 
separate clusters, consisting of four region types (Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Groningen, elsewhere in the Netherlands) and three bank types 
(general, mortgage, shipping banks). As there are no shipping banks located outside of Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland or Groningen, we use 11 
clusters. Overall, our clustering methodology leads to conservative estimates of standard errors. 
16 We report marginal effects at the median rather than at the mean to ensure our results are less affected by outliers (e.g. very large banks) 
17 We use the searchable historical newspaper collection of the Koninklijke Bibliotheek (http://kranten.delpher.nl). 
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through liquidation or merger. Overall we identify 33 banks that suffered distress. Fig. 3 depicts 
the timing of the various distress events, categorised by their method of resolution. 
The data used in the construction of our independent variables contains information on a 
sample of banks pertaining to the fiscal year 1917, extracted from the 1920 and 1921 editions of 
the Van Oss' Effectenboek, an investor manual published annually. We choose 1917 because it is 
the last stable year preceding the crisis. We aim to predict distress from data pertaining to a time 
when shareholders did not yet foresee it, and banks had not yet anticipated it. Fig. 4 shows the 
weighted stock price index of distressed and non-distressed banks,18 along with the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI),19 illustrating the depth of the deflationary crisis. The figure helps to justify the 
selection of 1917 as our point of reference on the grounds that it offers a middle road between 
setting the date too late and thus already incorporating crisis effects, and setting it too early, 
running the risk that the data are unrepresentative of pre-crisis conditions. In 1917, stock prices 
are still at levels comparable to previous years; the major changes to stock prices set in only after 
1920 and the CPI do not show signs of deflation before 1919. 
The exact dating of crisis periods is often controversial, and the Dutch crisis is no 
exception. Bernanke and James (1991) and Van Zanden (1997b) date it to 1921 and 1922 only; 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) follow their example, while Colvin (2011) considers the crisis to run 
from 1920 to 1927. This much longer period is preferable, because signs of bank distress were 
observed long after the Dutch economy had stabilised; some problems caused by the crisis took 
many years to fully manifest or be disclosed to the public; distress events were revealed only after 
the distress was resolved through liquidation, merger or reorganisation. The longer period 
                                                          
18 Stock prices (including dividends) are weighted to reflect a hypothetical portfolio which includes all the listed financial firms weighted by the book value of their 
equity on 31 December 1917. Our index therefore reflects what a possible investor who composed his portfolio in 1918, and kept this portfolio fixed, would observe when 
looking back at his investments. 
19 CPI is taken from the Statline database of the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (http://statline.cbs.nl/). 
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encompasses the earliest signs of bank distress before the major failure of Marx & Co.'s Bank in 
1922, extends the period beyond the Robaver debacle in 1924, and finally includes the 
government- backed reorganisation of the middenstandsbanken in 1927 which forever changed 
expectations about the role of the state in crisis resolution in the Netherlands (Colvin, 2011). Fig. 
4 suggests that the recovery of the banking sector began in 1926 for banks that experienced 
distress, and 1924 for those that did not. 
The Van Oss investor manuals bring together balance sheets, profit-and-loss accounts and 
detailed corporate governance information. Moreover, they include the location of banks' 
headquarters, their year of foundation, corporate statement, stock listing and stock prices. Table 1 
summarises the relative importance of various balance sheet items in our sample, which constitutes 
all the financial institutions for which sufficient data were available in Van Oss, and includes the 
vast majority of banks that were listed on Amsterdam's stock exchange during the period. Our 
database comprises 142 unique banks, where we distinguish between general (commercial) banks, 
specialised mortgage banks and shipping banks that specialised in financing international trade.20 
These 142 banks amount to 89% of the banks in the Netherlands counted by Van Oss, which 
equates to 83% of the sector's nominal equity value. 
Our financial information is based on the annual reports published by banks and firms 
themselves, which were used by the compilers of Van Oss in the production of their manuals. In 
order to facilitate comparative financial ratio analysis, we standardised and converted the 
accounting information to categories used in modern balance sheets and profit-and-loss accounts, 
adopting a procedure outlined in Appendix A to this article.21 In the 1910s, Dutch financial 
                                                          
20 We exclude DNB and Javasche Bank from our sample, since they acted as banks of issue for the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies. 
21 Appendix A Table A1 shows the balance sheet of Marx & Co. as an example of the sector, including both original (Panel A) and standardised 
(Panel B) balance sheets. 
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accounting practices differed from modern standards. Camffermann and Van den Brand (2010) 
provide a critical assessment of the usefulness of annual reports for empirical analyses and argue 
that prudence and conservatism induced an undervaluation of assets and, as a consequence, of 
equity.22 Many firms and banks had so-called silent or secret reserves. The creation of these 
reserves was accompanied by an underrepresentation of the profits, which were partially 
channelled into these reserves. We argue that financial ratios based on the accounting information 
can be useful in a comparative setting because results will be influenced only by the accounting 
practices in cases of systematic mis-valuation for particular firms. Camfferman and Van den Brand 
(2010, pp. 99-110) do not document such systematic effects. Furthermore, we agree with 
Camfferman and Van den Brand (2010, p. 115) that annual report information is a useful source 
because it describes the way in which directors present their firms to outsiders. 
In addition to reporting financial accounting data, Van Oss supplies comprehensive lists of 
all banks' directors (directeuren and commissarissen). We digitised and cross-referenced these lists 
with all other banks and non-financial firms for the same fiscal year to map any interlocking 
directorates. We use the Financieel Adresboek (1917), a financial gazetteer, to identify 2579 
locations (headquarters or branches) of financial institutions active in the Netherlands.23 For the 
142 banks in our sample we identify 350 branch locations. These data are used to map the market 
structure of the Dutch financial services sector and banks’ product market choices in the 11 
provinces that constituted the Netherlands at the time.24 
                                                          
22 See Zeff et al. (1992) for a detailed description of the development of financial reporting practices and rules in the Netherlands. 
23 We count 1,073 unique bank locations; many financial institutions held more than one branch in one particular location in the Netherlands. 
24 We measure competition on the basis that: (1) general banks compete only with other general banks; (2) mortgage banks compete with mortgage 
banks and general banks; and (3) shipping banks compete only with shipping banks. We found that our results were not sensitive to alternative 
market definitions. 
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Ideally, we would prefer to use information about banks’ asset portfolios, including their 
loans and equity participations, but this information is not available to us. Interlocking directorates 
instead help us to proxy for these portfolio characteristics. Therefore, we collect information from 
Van Oss about 232 non-financial firms quoted on Amsterdam’s stock exchange, in addition to the 
142 banks in our sample.25 The board information of the 374 banks and non-financials is used to 
map the relationships among banks and between banks and other firms based on interlocking 
directorates. Consequently we can quantify the effect of interlocks hypothesised by Jonker (1991) 
by using these firm and bank characteristics (size, leverage and profitability) in conjunction with 
the interlocks held by banks. 
The data described above are used to construct a range of variables which capture different 
aspects of balance sheet composition and corporate governance characteristics, described in the 
next section. We pitch these models against one another in a series of binomial regressions in order 
to arrive at a specification which does the best job of “predicting the past”. As standard goodness-
of-fit measures do not perform well with binomial regression models (Hosmer and Lemershow, 
2000), we adopt an approach popular in the medical literature; we calculate the so-called area 
under the receiver operating characteristic curve (abbreviated to AUC).26 This method is used in 
Taylor (2012) as a means of assessing the predictive ability of his models of global financial crises. 
Additionally, we use Shapely variance decomposition to explore how much power each variable 
category (bank characteristics, management structure and interlock characteristics) has in each 
                                                          
25 The 232 non-financial corporations are representative of the stock- listed population of non-financial corporations. Our results are therefore 
particular to banks that interlock with publicly-listed firms. 
26 We calculate the proportion of banks which we predicted to fail and actually did fail, or the proportion of true positives that our models classify 
as being positive (called the “sensitivity” of the model), and compare this with the proportion of banks which we predicted to survive and did 
survive, or the proportion of true negatives classified as being negative (called its “specificity”). We plot the sensitivity against the false positive 
fraction (1 - specificity) for all models in our analysis. The curve in such a graph is called the receiver operating characteristic (ROC). Any model 
that traces an ROC curve above the 45-degree line has a better predictive ability than a random assignment of observations. The larger the area 
under the ROC curve (abbreviated to AUC), the better is the predictive ability of the model. Metz (1978) describes the method used here in the 
context of medical statistics. 
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model specification. We follow a procedure similar to Gromping (2007) and Shorrocks (2012) in 
this respect. 
 
 
Figure 3: Timeline depicting the number of failures per year by method of resolution, 1920 to 1927. 
 
2.4 Variables and hypotheses 
As our core dependent variable indicating distress, we define a dummy variable which equals one 
if and only if a bank experiences and discloses distress in the period 1920 to 1927. We define three 
mutually exclusive types of distress resolution: liquidation (including bankruptcy), distressed 
merger and financial reorganisation.27 Notice that the crisis came in two phases (Fig. 3): 1920 to 
1922 as the first phase of bank distress, when a high proportion of failures was resolved through 
merger; and 1923 to 1927 as the second, when by far the most crisis-stricken banks looked to 
reorganisation.28 Table 2 reports by category concise definitions of all the variables used in the 
                                                          
27 We define reorganisations as one or any combination of asset restructuring and debt restructuring. 
28 We used alternative specifications of these phases in order to explore the possibility that distress events which became public in 1923 might 
merely have remained hidden for longer. We find that banks which were seen to be affected by the crisis in 1923 were more likely to: (1) have no 
interlocking directorates with DNB; and (2) be interlocked with more profitable and bigger non-financials. We conclude that banks which 
experienced distress in 1923 had more in common with banks which experienced distress after 1923. 
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analysis that follows. 
Financial variables 
For asset quality, we use the variable size (natural logarithm of total assets) to proxy for the 
possibility that large banks are less likely to fail because of a broader portfolio of investments, and 
age (natural logarithm of the difference between the year of foundation and 1917) to proxy for 
banks’ asset selection experience (following Thornhill and Amit, 2003). For loan book quality, we 
use the ratio of long-term loans outstanding to total assets (following Martin, 1977; Thomson, 
1991). For earnings sufficiency, we use return on assets and a measure of interest rate dependency 
(following Kolari et al., 2002). For liquidity and solvency, we capture the liquidity of banks’ assets 
by constructing a measure of how well banks manage to match the maturity of their assets with 
the maturity of their financing instruments, a measure of stability popular among contemporaries 
(Verrijn Stuart, 1921; Klijnveld, 1922; Sternheim, 1924). Additionally, we posit that banks whose 
stock was regularly quoted on Amsterdam’s official listing were more liquid since investors could 
sell their stake more easily in times of high volatility (following Kalev et al., 2003). To capture the 
effects of differences in capital structure we use total leverage (debt to total assets) and deposits to 
total assets (following Zmijewski, 1984). 
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Figure 4: Indices of stock prices of distressed and non-distressed banks, and Consumer Price Index (CPI), 1913 to 1929 (1913 = 100). 
 
Market structure variables 
The nature of the relationship between market structure, competition and bank stability is 
controversial. A dynamic model of asymmetric information of the type proposed in Keeley (1990), 
and used more recently in Allen and Gale (2004), suggests that there is a trade-off between 
competition and risk. But models which explore the possibility that bankers have little influence 
over the riskiness of their customers, such as that of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), find the opposite 
result. Empirical applications to US Depression-era banking markets abound (Calomiris and 
Mason, 2003; Carlson, 2004; Carlson and Mitchener, 2009). We construct three measures that map 
the degree of competition in the Dutch banking sector. We first define a dummy variable that 
equals one only if a bank had branches in the Netherlands. Consistent with Calomiris and Mason 
(2003) and Carlson (2004), we expect branching to increase the probability of suffering distress 
due to increased monitoring costs since the branches are farther removed from their headquarters. 
Second we identify banks that had international activities and posit that they will be more exposed 
18B_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
36 
 
to the macroeconomic shock of the early 1920s and hence face a higher probability of distress. To 
determine the structure of the banks’ product market, we define 11 geographic markets, being the 
provinces constituting the Netherlands. Then for each bank with presence in a province, we 
calculate the ratio of the number of locations (headquarters and branches) of that bank and the 
number of locations of all banks in our extended sample. For each bank we use the average of 
these ratios over all the regions where a bank is branched. We call this variable relative 
representation.29 As the literature has no firm conclusion on the competition- stability relationship, 
we remain agnostic about the influence of this variable. 
 
Management structure and characteristics of interlocks 
We introduce managerial influences by looking at the management structure and interlocking 
directorates of banks and the connectedness of banks and non-financial firms.30 We define 
management structure as the board size and the number of interlocking directorates. We expect 
that management structure variables negatively affect the risk of failure, in line with Darrat et al. 
(2010). In much the same way as Dittmann et al. (2010), we posit that bankers on the boards of 
other corporations are capital market experts and provide know-how and better access to funds 
(Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005), act as monitors (Morck and Nakamura, 1999), and promote their own 
business (Booth and Deli, 1999). Interlocking directorates measure the relative independence of a 
bank or firm's board, sinc banks with more interlocks are potentially more powerful in terms of 
                                                          
29 This metric takes into account the number of branches that each bank holds in different provinces and the importance of each of the provinces 
for each bank. For example, Robaver has 13 branches plus one headquarter, in total 14 locations spread over two provinces. In Noord-Holland the 
bank has two branches; in Zuid-Holland the bank has 12. There are 253 other banks and branches active in Noord- Holland. As the branches of a 
bank do not compete with one another, the bank faces competition from 251 rather than 253 other bank- branch locations. The relative representation 
of the bank in Noord- Holland is therefore 0.79% (2/251). For Zuid-Holland the bank has a relative representation of 4.25% (12/300). We weigh 
these relative representation measures by the number of branches the bank has in each of the two provinces, which yields 1.5% (0.79*2) and 51% 
(4.25*12) for Noord-Holland and Zuid-Holland. We sum these two and normalize by the number of banks, which generates our final indicator of 
relative representativeness, which yields a value of 3.8% ((1.5% + 51%)/14). 
30 In the ensuing analysis of interlocking directorates, we treat connections involving either directeuren or commissarissen as identical; we found 
that separately measuring interlocks involving each tier of banks' management boards did not affect our results and yielded no additional insight. 
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financial and industrial dominance, but may have a higher chance of suffering from possible 
conflicts of interest for bankers on the board (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). 
In addition to the governance roles of interlocks, we use the information as a proxy for 
banking relations. The economic effects of relationship banking is somewhat ambiguous, in that 
bank ties allow for information sharing, while they may also create hold-up problems (Braggion 
and Ongena, 2013). Indeed, some have gone so far as to argue that relationship banking has no 
measurable impact on firm financing or stability (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004). As an 
approximation of a bank's portfolio we measure the average across interlocks of asset size, leverage 
and profitability of all banks and all the non-financials that a bank is related to.31 We calculate a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure the level of the concentration of investments within 
banks' portfolios. In particular, we measure asset size concentration and industry concentration.3233 
Additionally we incorporate the external financing demand of industries averaged across 
interlocks to correct for the financial dependence of industries on the Dutch financial sector (after 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Quantifying the costs and benefits associated with bank relationships 
is done by looking at the number and type of interlocks held by each bank. 
  
                                                          
31 We use balance sheet characteristics of banks or non-financial firms (size, leverage and ROA) and construct a value-weighted average using total 
assets at the beginning of 1918 for each. The bank characteristics are presented in Table 3. The median non-financial firm in our sample has three 
million guilders in assets, financed by 34% of debt, generating a profit of 5% in 1917. The largest non-financial sectors are industrial firms (20%) 
and agricultural firms (24%). 
32 With respect to asset size concentration, we calculate an HHI as the sum of squared portions of each interlock's total assets relative to the sum of 
total assets of all interlocked banks or non-financials. For example, assume that bank A has interlock-relations with B and C, both with a size of 
500 thousand guilders in assets. The total size of the related banks is therefore 1000 thousand guilders. The index will then be 0.5, or (500/1000)2 
+ (500/1000)2. Obviously, the concentration index increases when bank A becomes interlocked with additional banks and when the size of bank B 
or C increases. 
33 Similarly, we measure industry concentration using an HHI based on share of banks' interlocks in each of the 11 industries listed in Van Oss 
(industrial; agriculture; mining; oil; rubber; shipping; tobacco; tea; railways; tram transport; and other). 
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Understanding bank distress 
Table 3 summarises the mean values for all variables as specified across the full sample of 142 
banks and sub-samples organised by bank type. We find that general commercial banks make up 
the largest portion in terms of asset size, while mortgage banks dominate in terms of number. 
Mortgage banks were highly specialised in long-term funds, while general banks held 
approximately equal totals of short- and long-term loans. We find that general banks were better 
able than mortgage and shipping banks to match the maturity of their assets with their liabilities 
and held significantly higher amounts in deposits. Furthermore, general banks that were 
interlocked more with non-financial corporations held significantly more directorates than more 
specialised banks. 
 
A univariate analysis of bank distress, timing and resolution 
Table 4 reports the mean and median values of all variables as specified across the full sample of 
142 banks, categorised by distress experience during the 1920s. We find that banks which 
experienced distress during this period were younger, more likely to have a stock listing and held 
more deposits. Additionally we find that banks suffered more when they had more branches, were 
active internationally and had a larger market share. When we separate early (1920 to 1922) from 
late (1923 to 1927) distress events, we find that: (1) bigger and older banks failed during the second 
rather than the first part of the 1920s, which corroborates the claim made by one contemporary 
observer (Verrijn Stuart, 1921) that larger banks are likely able to weather a crisis for longer; (2) 
banks which better matched the maturity of their (short-term) assets with that of their (short-term) 
liabilities were more prone to debt-deflationary shock and subsequently suffered distress earlier; 
(3) banks which had fewer interlocking directorates experienced distress earlier; (4) banks which 
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had interlocking directorates with large banks were more likely to experience distress during the 
latter part of the crisis; and (5) banks which had large and concentrated interlocking directorates 
with nonfinancial firms failed later in the crisis. 
 
A baseline model of distress 
A series of four regressions is reported in Table 5. We examine the effect of five categories of 
variable independently and then together. In model (1) we find that bank age has a significant 
negative effect, which shows that younger banks were more likely to fail. We also find that 
exchange-listed banks were about 25% more likely to experience distress. This may be driven by 
the liquidity of the stock and the resulting volatility, consistent with Kalev et al. (2003); it may, 
however, reflect the possibility that unlisted banks were better able to hide their distress. 
We find a strong effect for profitability. Profits in 1917 are in our view an indication of the 
riskiness of the banks’ activities, which in good times bring higher earnings, but lead to a backlash 
under worsened conditions, much in line with Fahlenbrach et al.’s finding (2012) for US banks 
in the modern era. We find that banks which failed were also more highly valued before 
the crisis than those that did not; from 1916 to 1919, the stock prices of banks which would go on 
to experience distress increased by about 10%, versus 0.6% for non-distressed banks (see Fig. 4). 
This suggests that banks which did best out of the Netherlands’ neutrality during the First World 
War and the short post-war economic boom had most to lose in any ensuing economic reversal. 
For each percentage increase in leverage, we find that the probability of banks’ distress increases 
by about 50%, showing that lower equity buffers make banks vulnerable to shocks. This is 
consistent with the argument in Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) that this crisis was debt-
deflationary. We control for bank size and long-term loans, but find no significant effects. 
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In model (2) we add four variables describing earning sufficiency, liquidity and solvency, 
and capital structure. We find that deposits have a significant positive effect, where each additional 
percentage of deposits relative to assets increases the probability of failure by about 45%. As is 
common to many financial crises, banks which relied more heavily on callable deposits rather than 
other types of financing stood a greater chance of failure. The other three variables show no effects 
that are statistically significant. 
Model (3) introduces our three product market variables. We find that branching has a 
significantly positive effect, which indicates that banks with branch networks faced significant 
monitoring problems and increased risk exposure as the branches became more removed from 
their headquarters. This finding is consistent with Calomiris and Mason (2003) and Carlson (2004), 
where bank branching induces higher failure rates. We find that banks with international activities 
were about 20% more likely to experience distress because they were more exposed to pressures 
exogenous to the Dutch economy. We find no effect of banks’ relative representation, our domestic 
market structure variable. This is a very interesting finding; it suggests that bank distress was 
driven by the joint effect of the economic shock and strategic choices within banks, rather than 
any competitive pressures from one another. In model (4) we retain all variables with an absolute 
t-value above unity and rerun our model.34 This specification suggests that, after controlling for 
the product market choices of banks, long-term loans also significantly affect distress probability. 
The reported AUC values demonstrate that our model specifications in Table 5 perform (“predict 
the past”) significantly better than random assignments. We find that measures of asset quality, 
earnings sufficiency, stock listing and bank capital structure have the largest explanatory power. 
                                                          
34 This model includes only statistically relevant variables and can therefore be said to be the most parsimonious specification. The statistical power 
of this model remains unaffected by this choice in terms of pseudo R-squared or AUC. 
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The effects of interlocking directorates 
Panel A of Table 6 shows the results of logistic regressions with respect to our hypotheses, where: 
model specification (5) encapsulates the effect of banks' management structure on the probability 
of experiencing distress during the 1920s; model (6) focuses on the characteristics of interlocked 
banks; model (7) introduces three additional characteristics of interlocked non-banks; and model 
(8) combines all these effects. Again we omit each variable with a t-value below one or with an 
obvious correlation with subsequently introduced variables. 
 
Management structure 
We find that a bank with a large board stood significantly less chance of experiencing distress; a 
1% increase in board size results in a reduction of distress probability in the range of 12 to 26%.35 
This is somewhat contrary to Simpson and Gleason (1999), who find that, for publicly listed banks, 
the size of a bank's board negatively affects costs and efficiency and increases the probability of 
distress. We suggest that a larger board signifies more “in-house experience” to cope with crisis 
management. 
 
Characteristics of interlocked banks 
We find that interlocks with large banks reduce the failure risk (by about 6%), while the 
profitability of these banks has an adverse effect. Our results imply that banks with ties to smaller 
and more profitable banks were engaging in relations with riskier peers, which negatively affect 
their survival chances. Together, these results suggest that the mere presence of an interlock does 
not in itself result in a conflict of interest. Intrinsically, then, interlocking directorates have risk-
                                                          
35 The results remain robust after controlling for potential non-linear properties. 
21B_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
42 
 
reducing properties; however these risk properties depend on the corporate characteristics of the 
interlocks.36 
Characteristics of interlocked non-banks 
We find that banks that concentrated their interlocks with non-financials were significantly less at 
risk during the crisis than those banks that held well diversified portfolios. The effect is relatively 
large as we find that a 1% increase in concentration leads to an increased failure probability of 
17%. This result suggests that banks with concentrated interlocks were better able to monitor their 
interests through their networks. 
Using variance decomposition in Panel B of Table 6 we find that banks' financial 
characteristics explain over 70% of the variation in the probability of their distress. Additionally 
we find that the characteristics of interlocks explain approximately 21% of the variation. This is 
driven by interlocks with banks rather than non-financials. We show that the quality of our model 
improves by about 7% - comparing the AUCs of models (4) and (8) - because we add interlocking 
characteristics (see Fig. 5).37 In summary, we find evidence that Jonker (1989, 1991) was correct 
but incomplete in believing that interlocks added to the riskiness for banks. We show that Jonker's 
ideas can be expressed more precisely in terms of the characteristics of interlocked banks and non-
financial firms, such as firm size, leverage, profitability and concentration. 
Robustness 
Tables 7 and 8 report a number of additional results intended to determine whether our findings 
are robust to alternative model specifications and sample selection biases. Together they suggest 
                                                          
36 We find that the effect of return on assets disappears when we take the profitability of interlocked banks into account. This may be due to either: 
(1) the presence of a competitive advantage which other banks want to benefit from by interlocking with these more profitable banks; or (2) these 
more profitable banks have superior asset selection and monitoring abilities in terms of selecting firms that are able to meet their bank obligations; 
or (3) both of these. This being the case, the profitability of a bank is associated with the profitability of its interlocks. 
37 For the AUC, a common rule-of-thumb is that values between 0.9 and 1 should be considered outstanding; between 0.8 and 0.9 excellent; and 
between 0.7 and 0.8 acceptable (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000, pp. 156-164). 
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that our main results on banks’ balance sheet characteristics, management structure and 
interlocking directorates are not sensitive to the inclusion of additional variables or the use of 
restricted samples. 
Model (9) is for the sub-sample of banks for which sufficient historical data were available 
to calculate asset growth. We find that asset growth has a non-significant positive effect, while the 
goodness-of-fit increases and all bank characteristics keep their sign and significance. We find that 
asset growth shows significant correlation (21%) with the size of interlocked banks, which 
subsequently becomes (though only marginally) insignificant.38 The results of model (10) are 
consistent with the idea that sharing a director with a large and influential private bank has risk-
reducing properties: one such interlock reduces failure risk by approximately 11% from the median 
- though this is not statistically significant at standard levels. Model (11) includes a dummy 
variable that equals one only if some portion of a bank’s equity capital remains unpaid. It is 
included to test the hypothesis that uncalled capital can act as an equity buffer in times of crisis 
(Turner et al., 2005). Its inclusion has no discernible impact on our results. 
                                                          
38 Accordingly we argue that prior asset growth was industry wide, hence the correlation. 
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Figure 5: Receiver operating characteristics (ROC). 
 
The discrete choice model in our analyses does not take into account the timing of distress. 
Potentially, the weakest banks are the first to enter distress, while stronger banks fail at a later 
stage of the crisis. In order to test for the relevance of the timing of distress we present a Cox 
proportional hazards model in Table 8, specifications (12) through (15).39 We find that our earlier 
results (in Table 6) are consistent with those of the hazards models; the signs and significance of 
the variables remain stable. Additionally the variance decomposition shows a similar distribution 
of explanatory power across the variable categories; the majority of the variance is still explained 
by bank characteristics, followed by the characteristics of interlocked banks. Two expected 
changes occur when using the hazards models: (1) the size of interlocked banks becomes 
(marginally) non-significant, which is consistent with our findings, presented in Table 4, that banks 
interlocked with large banks are better able to longer withstand the crisis; and (2) our long-term 
                                                          
39 The estimation equation of the Cox proportional hazards model is given by݄ሺݐǡ ܺሻ ൌ ݄଴ሺݐሻሺσ ߚ௜
௣
௜ୀଵ ௜ܺሻ, where ݄଴ሺݐሻ is the baseline hazard 
and ௜ܺ a vector of firm-specific variables concerning bank characteristics, management structure and characteristics of interlocked banks and non-
banks. We report marginal effects at the median to keep the findings comparable to earlier results. 
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loans variable has become (marginally) non-significant, which is consistent with our findings 
presented in Table 4 that banks that fail later in the crisis hold more long-term loans. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This article adds to the historiography of the 1920s by systematically measuring the differences 
between the banks that suffered financial distress in the Netherlands’ biggest twentieth century 
financial crisis and those that did not. While the root debt deflationary macroeconomic cause of 
the 1920s crisis was largely exogenous to the Netherlands, this article shows how factors 
endogenous to the Dutch financial services sector were crucial in explaining banks' differing fates. 
Our analysis explains why some banks failed in the 1920s while others survived unscathed, 
something Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) omit to specify precisely in their analysis. We suggest 
that debt-deflation's impact depended on banks' balance sheet characteristics and management 
structure. Decisions made before the deflationary shock were indicative of banks’ ensuing 
probability of survival; their exposure to distress was partly attributable to past policies. We find 
that younger banks, banks that were stock listed, banks that had high leverage ratios, banks that 
engaged in branching and international activities, and banks with large quantities of deposits were 
more at risk during the 1920s. 
In particular we find that the characteristics of the financial firms with which a bank shares 
managerial ties have a high predictive power. Jonker (1989, 1991) uses the number of interlocking 
directorates as an indicator of the developmental path of the Dutch banking system. He implies 
that the Dutch banking sector’s retreat from universal banking in the late 1920s is proof that this 
corporate governance mechanism did not operate well in times of crisis. Our article contributes to 
Jonker’s analysis by exploring the mechanism through which managerial interconnectedness had 
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an impact on banking stability. We provide evidence that it was the characteristics - size and 
profitability - of the banks rather than the non-financial firms at the other end of interlocks that 
drove Jonker’s hypothesised relationship. As such, we argue that conflicts of interest found in case 
studies of the crisis (in particular, Colvin, 2014) are best understood as a function of the corporate 
characteristics of those interlocks. 
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Data appendix 
This appendix describes with the aid of an example how the accounting and governance data 
collected from Van Oss were standardised and converted to consistent categories across all firms: 
we use Marx & Co.’s Bank, probably the most high-profile casualty in the early part of the 1920s 
crisis. 
Table 1, Panel A shows the 1918 balance sheet of Marx & Co.’s Bank, as published at the 
time. The bank’s assets are noted in the left-hand panel and are divided into: Aand. in portef. 
(unplaced equity); Kassa (cash held in the firm); Wiss., coupons en spec (short-term loans); 
Bankiers (cash held at banks); Effecten (investments in financial assets); Fondsen af te leveren 
(deliverable funds); Voorschot. in rek.-crt. tegen effecten en beleeningen op effecten (advances 
against financial assets and/or accounts payable); Voorschot. tegen goed., hyp of borgst. (advances 
against goods, mortgages or bail); Saldo’s rek.-crt (net accounts receivable); Gebouwen en safes 
(building and safes); and Meubilair (furniture). The bank’s liability structure is listed in the right-
hand panel and is divided into: Kapitaal (nominal equity capital); Reserve (equity reserves); 
Personeelfonds (funds available for employees); Bankiers (cash stored by other banks); Effecten 
in beleening gegeven (invested funds under management from third parties); Saldo’s r.crt. en dep. 
(net accounts payable and deposits); Id. v. rek. v. derden (net payable accounts from third parties); 
Accepten en traites (accepted short term loans); Dividend (dividends); and Onverdeeld (retained 
profits).  
Table 1, Panel B shows the same balance sheet converted to standardised categories which 
are consistent across all the sampled banks. Assets are divided into: fixed assets, financial assets 
and current assets; and the equity and liability structure consists of equity capital, provisions and 
long- and short-term liabilities. Short-term liabilities consist of accounts payable and short-term 
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loans. The difference between equity reserves and provisions is the nature of the reservation. Cases 
in which the purpose of a reserve was clearly stated have been classified as provisions. In some 
cases, the item aandeelhouders (shareholders) was found on the left-hand side of the balance sheet. 
This signalled that there is unpaid equity capital, which the bank could call upon in times of need. 
This item was subtracted from the balance sheet and the nominal equity capital was lowered 
accordingly. The same procedure was followed for all 143 banks in our sample and the 234 non-
financial firms that were used in the calculation of the interlock characteristics. 
For the governance data, we compiled a list of all directors and supervisors on the boards 
of all banks and non-financial corporations at the start of 1918. This yielded 1,269 individuals 
sitting on the boards of 143 banks and 1,625 individuals sitting on the boards of 234 non-financial 
corporations. Subsequently, we cross-referenced each individual and found that each bank had on 
average seven interlocks with other banks and non-financial corporations. We count multiple 
interlocks with one bank (or non-financial firm) as one interlock only. 
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Variable (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management structure
Board size (log) -0.122* -0.214*** -0.252*** -0.257***
(-1.722) (-2.612) (-3.597) (-3.321)
Interlock with DNB -0.002
(-0.017)
Total interlocks with banks (log) -0.037
(-0.386)
Total interlocks with non-banks (log) -0.052
(-1.042)
Characteristics of interlocked banks
Size of interlocked banks (log) -0.042 -0.055** -0.058**
(-1.237) (-1.968) (-2.198)
Profitability of interlocked banks 8.678*** 10.231*** 10.137***
(4.421) (4.251) (4.394)
Leverage of interlocked banks 0.018
(0.117)
Concentration of interlocked banks 0.211 0.212
(1.149) (1.223)
Characteristics of interlocked non-banks
Size of interlocked non-banks (log) -0.048
(-0.531)
Profitability of interlocked non-banks 0.449
(0.644)
Leverage of interlocked non-banks 0.025
(0.065)
Concentration of interlocked non-banks -0.151 -0.173**
(-1.600) (-2.225)
Industry concentration of interlocked non-banks 0.032
(0.261)
External financing demand -0.104
(-0.313)
Bank characteristics
Bank size (log) 0.000 -0.019 -0.025 -0.024
(0.008) (-0.722) (-0.639) (-0.649)
Bank age (log) -0.075** -0.079*** -0.087*** -0.088***
(-2.135) (-3.731) (-3.912) (-4.483)
Long-term loans 0.128 0.219*** 0.228** 0.229**
(1.621) (3.719) (2.416) (2.201)
Stock listing 0.145*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.153***
(3.095) (3.053) (2.980) (4.191)
Return on assets 1.357 0.407 0.788 0.800
(1.232) (0.385) (0.844) (0.847)
Leverage 0.368** 0.554*** 0.623*** 0.616***
(2.301) (3.148) (4.811) (4.708)
Maturity matching 0.059 0.187* 0.212* 0.212**
(0.507) (1.925) (1.908) (2.141)
Deposits 0.562*** 0.784*** 0.805*** 0.823***
(2.749) (3.877) (3.310) (3.565)
Branches 0.075 0.069 0.089** 0.090***
(1.269) (1.459) (2.141) (3.970)
International activities 0.231*** 0.265*** 0.275*** 0.278***
(2.620) (4.612) (4.006) (4.840)
Observations 142 142 142 142
No. of distressed banks 33 33 33 33
Headquarter region indicators YES YES YES YES
Bank type indicators YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.295 0.389 0.403 0.402
AUC 0.862 0.894 0.893 0.893
Panel A: Marginal effects
Table 6: Influence of management and interlock characteristics on the probability of bank dis 
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Management structure 11% 5% 7% 7%
Characteristics of interlocked banks 17% 20% 20%
Characteristics of interlocked non-banks 4% 1% 1%
Bank characteristics 89% 73% 72% 72%
Panel B: Shapely decomposition of explained variance
The dependent variable is a binominal variable that equals one if and only if a bank has gone into distress during the period 1920-1927. 
Measures of size and bank age are logaritmic transformations. Marginal effects are calculated at the median. All specifications 
include headquarter region and bank type indicators. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard-errors are clustered 
using eleven groups comprised of relevant bank type and headquarter region combinations. Significance levels are indicated as follows: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6 (continued) 
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Variable (9) (10) (11)
Additional variables
Asset growth 0.134
(1.270)
Interlock with influential private bank -0.082
(-1.244)
Liability regime choice 0.078
(0.808)
Variables from previous analysis
Bank size (log) -0.028 -0.023 -0.022
(-0.564) (-0.633) (-0.572)
Bank age (log) -0.143*** -0.082*** -0.093***
(-2.675) (-3.936) (-4.136)
Long-term loans 0.312*** 0.206** 0.244***
(2.947) (2.041) (2.576)
Stock listing 0.152*** 0.184*** 0.206**
(3.248) (4.445) (2.555)
Return on assets 0.209 0.880 0.788
(0.317) (0.948) (0.850)
Leverage 0.529*** 0.587*** 0.536**
(3.394) (4.816) (2.541)
Maturity matching 0.173 0.181** 0.235**
(1.440) (2.290) (2.380)
Deposits 0.738*** 0.749*** 0.821***
(2.954) (3.717) (3.326)
Branches 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.083***
(4.179) (3.658) (5.522)
International activities 0.256*** 0.281*** 0.278***
(3.276) (4.849) (4.750)
Board size (log) -0.278*** -0.267*** -0.273***
(-3.637) (-3.432) (-3.411)
Size of interlocked banks (log) -0.044 -0.052** -0.057**
(-1.163) (-1.969) (-2.129)
Profitability of interlocked banks 10.644*** 10.087*** 10.657***
(3.110) (4.460) (4.109)
Concentration of interlocked banks 0.255 0.212 0.231
(1.232) (1.233) (1.299)
Concentration of interlocked non-banks -0.180** -0.130 -0.179**
(-2.060) (-1.189) (-2.355)
Observations 133 142 142
No. of distressed banks 33 33 33
Headquarter region indicators YES YES YES
Bank type indicators YES YES YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.419 0.406 0.405
AUC 0.904 0.898 0.894
The dependent variable is a binominal variable that equals one if and only if a bank has gone into distress during the 
period 1920-1927. Measures of size and bank age are logaritmic transformations. Marginal effects are calculated at 
the median. All specifications include headquarter region and bank type indicators. Robust z-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. Standard-errors are clustered using eleven groups comprised of relevant bank type and headquarter 
region combinations. Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7: Additional logistic regressions of bank distress, marginal effects. 
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Variable (12) (13) (14) (15)
Management structure
Board size (log) -1.185 -1.613** -1.801*** -1.755***
(-1.478) (-1.994) (-2.832) (-2.817)
Interlock with DNB -0.029
(-0.041)
Total interlocks with banks (log) -0.097
(-0.164)
Total interlocks with non-banks (log) -0.320
(-0.982)
Characteristics of interlocked banks
Size of interlocked banks (log) -0.176 -0.224 -0.278
(-0.707) (-1.316) (-1.611)
Profitability of interlocked banks 48.563*** 65.317*** 63.198***
(4.438) (4.337) (4.546)
Leverage of interlocked banks -0.293
(-0.209)
Concentration of interlocked banks 0.948 1.134
(0.911) (1.040)
Characteristics of interlocked non-banks
Size of interlocked non-banks (log) -0.579
(-1.051)
Profitability of interlocked non-banks 5.530
(1.241)
Leverage of interlocked non-banks 0.546
(0.230)
Concentration of interlocked non-banks -1.527* -1.683**
(-1.745) (-2.300)
Industry concentration of interlocked non-banks 0.622
(0.891)
External financing demand 0.022
(0.008)
Bank characteristics
Bank size (log) -0.130 -0.228 -0.350 -0.379
(-0.383) (-1.374) (-1.053) (-1.242)
Bank age (log) -0.412*** -0.557*** -0.553*** -0.549***
(-3.741) (-5.668) (-5.665) (-6.319)
Long-term loans 1.198 1.942 2.000* 1.902
(1.261) (1.482) (1.647) (1.616)
Stock listing 1.251** 1.623** 1.675** 1.564***
(2.357) (2.414) (2.324) (3.055)
Return on assets 10.231 1.135 7.181 6.839
(1.112) (0.225) (0.988) (0.998)
Leverage 2.357* 3.783 4.946*** 4.590***
(1.671) (1.445) (3.148) (3.105)
Maturity matching 1.110* 1.750*** 2.135** 2.350***
(1.862) (3.751) (2.308) (2.662)
Deposits 2.869* 4.283** 4.694** 4.774***
(1.845) (2.327) (2.478) (2.648)
Branches 0.598** 0.742** 1.098** 1.057***
(2.070) (2.023) (2.551) (3.041)
International activities 1.246 1.259*** 1.453*** 1.433**
(1.542) (2.580) (2.906) (2.447)
Observations 142 142 142 142
No. of distressed banks 33 33 33 33
Headquarter region indicators YES YES YES YES
Bank type indicators YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.142 0.192 0.197 0.194
Chi-squared 101 173 6553 183
Panel A: Marginal effects
Table 8: Influence of management and interlock characteristics, Cox proportional hazards models. 
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Management structure 13% 5% 6% 7%
Characteristics of interlocked banks 9% 11% 11%
Characteristics of interlocked non-banks 9% 2% 0%
Bank characteristics 87% 76% 81% 82%
Panel B: Shapely decomposition of explained variance
The dependent variable is a binominal variable that equals one if and only if a bank has gone into distress during the period 
1920-1927. Measures of size and bank age are logaritmic transformations. Marginal effects are calculated at the median. All 
specifications include headquarter region and bank type indicators. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard-
errors are clustered using eleven groups comprised of relevant bank type and headquarter region combinations. Significance 
levels are indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8 (continued) 
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Assets Liabilities
Aand. in portef. 4,000,000   12,000,000 Kapitaal
Kassa 756,252     1,700,000   Reserve
Wiss., coupons en spec. 12,220,201 99,743       Personeelfonds
Bankiers 4,442,787   8,412,586   Bankiers
Effecten 1,437,820   1,979,900   
Effect in beleening 
gegeven
Fonds af te leveren 557,910     19,007,074 Saldo's r.ct en dep.
Voorschott. in rek-crt. tegen 
effecten en beleeningen op 
effecten 12,367,254 - Id. v. rek. v. derden
Id. tegen goed., hyp. of borgst. 6,107,550   2,651,034   Accepten en traites
Saldo's rek.-crt. 4,178,309   660,000     Dividend
Gebouw en safes 450,000     7,747         Onverdeeld
Meubilair 1               
46,518,085 46,518,085 Total liabilities
Assets Liabilities
Fixed assets 450,001     8,000,000   Equity capital
Long-term debt -            1,707,747   Reserves
Equity investment 1,437,820   99,743       Provisions
Short-term debt 34,873,315 -            Bonds and mortgages
Receivables -            27,419,661 Deposits
Cash 5,199,039   -            Other long-term liabilities
Other non-cash 557,910     2,651,034   Short-term credits
660,000     Payables
1,979,900   Other short-term liabilities
Total assets* 42,518,085 42,518,085 Total liabilities*
Panel B: Converted standardized categories
Panel A: Contemporary categories
* Total assets and liabilities quoted in coverted standardized balance sheets do not 
necessarily equal those in contemporary balance sheets. This is because they have been 
adjusted to reflect shareholder capital that has either not been placed, or not yet been called.
Table A1: Balance sheet of Marx & Co.'s Bank, 1 January 1918. 
 
 
 
31B_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
62 
 
List of references 
Acharya, V., Philippon, T., Richardson, M., Roubini, N., 2009. The financial crisis of 2007-
2009: causes and remedies. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 18 (2), 89-137. 
Allen, F., Gale, D., 2004. Competition and financial stability. Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking 36 (3), 453-480. 
Barro, R.J., Ursua, J.F., 2008. Macroeconomic crises since 1870. NBER Working Paper, No. 
13940. 
Bernanke, B., James, H., 1991. The gold standard, deflation and financial crisis in the Great 
Depression: an international comparison. In: Hubbard, R.G. (Ed.), Financial Markets and 
Financial Crises. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 33-68.  
Boeschoten, W.C., 1992. Hoofdlijnen van de economische geschiedenis van Nederland 1900-
1990. NIBE, Amsterdam. 
Booth, J.R., Deli, D.N., 1999. On executives of financial institutions as outside directors. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 5 (3), 227-250. 
Bordo, M., Rockoff, H., 1996. The gold standard as a “good housekeeping seal of approval”. 
The Journal of Economic History 56 (2), 389-428. 
Boyd, J.H., De Nicolo, G., 2005. The theory of bank risk taking and competition revisited. The 
Journal of Finance 60 (3), 1329-1343. 
  
32A_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
63 
 
Braggion, F., Ongena, S., 2013. A century of firm-bank relationships: did banking sector 
deregulation spur firms to add banks and borrow more? Available at SSRN: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 1749617. 
Byrd, D.T., Mizruchi, M.S., 2005. Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms. Journal of 
Corporate Finance 11 (1), 129-173. 
Calomiris, C., Mason, J., 2003. Fundamentals, panics, and bank distress during the Depression. 
American Economic Review 93 (5), 1615-1647. 
Camffermann, K., Van den Brand, B.R.C.J., 2010. Broncommentaren 8: Jaarverslagen van 
Nederlandse ondernemingen vanaf 1811 tot 2005. Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 
The Hague. 
Carlson, M., 2004. Are branch banks better survivors? Evidence from the Depression Era. 
Economic Inquiry 42 (1), 111-126. 
Carlson, M., Mitchener, K.J., 2009. Branch banking as a device for discipline: competition and 
bank survivorship during the Great Depression. Journal of Political Economy 117 (2), 165-210. 
Colvin, C.L., 2011. Religion, competition and liability: Dutch cooperative banking in crisis, 
1919-1927. PhD Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
Colvin, C.L., 2014. Interlocking directorates and conflicts of interest: The Rotterdamsche 
Bankvereeniging, Muller & Co. and the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s. Business History 
56 (2), 314-334. 
Colvin, C.L., McLaughlin, E., 2014. Raiffeisenism abroad: why did German cooperative 
banking fail in Ireland but prosper in the Netherlands? Economic History Review 67 (2), 492-
516. 
32B_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
64 
 
Darrat, A.F., Gray, S., Wu, Y., 2010. Does board composition affect the risk of bankruptcy? 
Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1710412. 
De Graaf, T., 2012. Voor handel en maatschappij: Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij, 1824-1964. Boom, Amsterdam. 
De Jong, H.J., 2005. Between the devil and the deep blue sea: the Dutch economy during World 
War I. In: Broadberry, S.N., Harrison, M. (Eds.), The Economics of World War I. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, pp. 137-168. 
De Jong, A., Roell, A., 2005. Financing and control in the Netherlands. In: Mork, R.K. (Ed.), 
A History of Corporate Governance Around the World. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
pp. 467-506. 
De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), 2000. Nederlandse financiele instellingen in de twintigste 
eeuw: Balansreeksen en namenlijst van handelsbanken. DNB Statistisch Cahier, No. 3. 
NIBE/SVV, Amsterdam. 
De Vries, J., 1976. Een eeuw vol effecten: Historische schets van de Vereniging voor de 
Effectenhandel en de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs 1876-1976. Vereneging voor de 
Effectenhandel, Amsterdam. 
De Vries, J., 1989. Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Bank: Visserings tijdvak 1914-1931, 
vol. 5. NIBE, Amsterdam (Part 1). 
Dittmann, I., Maug, E., Schneider, C., 2010. Bankers on the boards of German firms: what they 
do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there. Review of Finance 14 (1), 35-71. 
Eichengreen, B.J., 1992. Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-
1939. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
33A_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
65 
 
Elyasiani, E., Goldberg, L.G., 2004. Relationship lending: a survey of the literature. Journal of 
Economics and Business 56 (4), 315-330. 
Euwe, J., 2010. Financing Germany: Amsterdam’s role as an international financial centre 
1914-1931. In: Babeau, P., Ogren, A. (Eds.), Convergence and Divergence ofNational 
Financial Systems: Evidence from the Gold Standard, 1871-1971 (Chapter 12). Pickering & 
Chatto Publishers, London. 
Fahlenbrach, R., Prilmeier, R., Stulz, R., 2012. This time is the same: using bank performance 
in 1998 to explain bank performance during the recent financial crisis. The Journal of Finance 
67 (6), 2139-2185. 
(1917). Financieel adresboek voor Nederland. J. H. de Bussy, Amsterdam. 
Fisher, I., 1933. The debt-deflation theory of great depressions. Econometrica 1 (4), 337-338. 
Fohlin, C., 1999. Universal banks in pre-World War I Germany: model or myth? Explorations 
in Economic History 36 (4), 305-343. 
Fohlin, C., 2007. Finance Capitalism and Germany’s Rise to Industrial Power. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Gromping, U., 2007. Estimators of relative importance in linear regression based on variance 
decomposition. The American Statistician 61 (2), 139-147. 
  
33B_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
66 
 
Hosmer, D.W., Lemershow, S., 2000. Applied Logistic Regression, 2nd ed. John Wiley and 
Sons, Hoboken. 
Jonker, J., 1989. Waterdragers van het kapitalisme: Nevenfuncties van Nederlandse bankiers 
en de verhouding tussen bankwezen en bedrijfsleven, 1910-1940. Jaarboek voor de 
Geschiedenis van Bedrijf en Techniek 6, 158-190. 
Jonker, J., 1991. Sinecures or sinews of power? Interlocking directorship and bank-industry 
relations in the Netherlands, 1910-1940. Economic and Social History in the Netherlands 3, 
119-132. 
Jonker, J., 1995. Spoilt for choice? Banking concentration and the structure ofthe Dutch 
banking market. In: Cassis, Y., Feldman, G.D., Olsson, U. (Eds.), The Evolution of Financial 
Institutions and Markets in Twentieth-Century Europe (187-208). Scholar Press, Aldershot, pp. 
1900-1940. 
Jonker, J., 1996. Between private responsibility and public duty. The origins of bank 
monitoring in the Netherlands, 1860-1930. Financial History Review 3 (2), 139-152. 
Jonker, J., 2002. Competing in tandem: securities markets and commercial banking patterns in 
Europe during the nineteenth century. In: Forsyth, D.J., Verdier, D. (Eds.), The Origins of 
National Financial Systems: Alexander Gerschenkron Reconsidered. Routledge, New York, 
pp. 64-86. 
Jonker, J., van Zanden, J.L., 1995. Method in the madness? Banking crises between the wars, 
an international comparison. In: Feinstein, C.H. (Ed.), Banking, Currency and Finance in 
Europe Between the Wars. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 77-93. 
Jordan, D.J., Rice, D., Sanchez, J., Walker, C., Wort, D.H., 2010. Predicting bank failures: 
34A_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
67 
 
evidence from 2007 to 2010. Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1652924. 
Kalev, P., Pham, P., Steen, A., 2003. Underpricing, stock allocation, ownership structure and 
post-listing liquidity ofnewly listed firms. Journal of Banking and Finance 27 (5), 919-947. 
Keeley, M.C., 1990. Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking. American 
Economic Review 80 (5), 1183-1200. 
Klijnveld, P., 1922. Organisatie, administratie en controle van het bankbedrijf: De grootbank. 
Het Bankwezen. Uitgeversmaatschappij v/h Delwel, Amsterdam. 
Kolari, J., Glennon, D., Hwan, S., Caputo, M., 2002. Predicting large US commercial bank 
failures. Journal of Economics and Business 54 (4), 361-387. 
Kramer, H.A.E., 1928. Reorganisaties van Naamlooze Vennootschappen in Nederland 1920-
1926. PhD Dissertation, Nederlandsche Handelshoogeschool, Rotterdam. 
Kroszner, R.S., Rajan, R.G., 1994. Is the Glass-Steagall Actjustified? A study of the U.S. 
experience of universal banking before 1933. American Economic Review 84 (4), 810-832. 
Kroszner, R.S., Strahan, P.E., 2001. Bankers on boards: monitoring, conflicts of interest and 
lender liability. Journal of Financial Economics 62 (3), 415-452. 
Lo, A.W., 2013. Reading about the financial crisis: a twenty-one-book review. Journal of 
Economic Literature 50 (1), 151-178. 
Martin, D., 1977. Early warning of bank failure: a logit regression approach. Journal of 
Banking and Finance 1 (3), 249-276. 
Metz, C.E., 1978. Basic principles of ROC analysis. Seminars in Nuclear Medicine 8 (4), 283-
298. 
34B_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
68 
 
Meyer, P.A., Pifer, H.W., 1970. Prediction of bank failures. The Journal of Finance 25 (4), 
853-868. 
Morck, R., Nakamura, M., 1999. Banks and corporate control in Japan. The Journal ofFinance 
54 (1), 319-339. 
Pettway, R., Sinkey, J., 1980. Establishing on-site bank examination priorities: an early 
warning system using accounting and market information. The Journal of Finance 35 (1), 137-
150. 
Rajan, R.G., Zingales, L., 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Economic 
Review 88 (3), 559-586. 
Ravi Kumar, P., Ravi, V., 2007. Bankruptcy prediction in banks and firms via statistical and 
intelligent techniques — A review. European Journal of Operational Research 180 (1), 1-28. 
Reinhart, C.M., Rogoff, K.S., 2009. This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Shorrocks, A.F., 2012. Decomposition procedures for distributional analysis: a unified 
framework based on the Shapley value. Journal of Economic Inequality 11 (1), 99-126. 
Simpson, W.G., Gleason, A.E., 1999. Board structure, ownership, and financial distress in 
banking firms. International Review of Economics and Finance 8 (3), 281 -292. 
Solomou, S., 1996. Themes in Macroeconomic History: The UK Economy, 1919-1939. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Sternheim, A., 1924. Leerboek der accountancy: Handleiding ten dienste van accountants en 
assistent-accountants, directeuren en commissarissen van naamlooze vennootschappen, 
35A_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
69 
 
kooplieden, bankiers en industrieelen. Uitgeversmaatschappij v/h Delwel, Amsterdam. 
Taylor, A.M., 2012. The Great Leveraging. NBER Working Papers, No. 18290. 
Thomson, J.B., 1991. Predicting bank failures in the 1980s. Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland. Economic Review Q(I), pp. 9-20. 
Thornhill, S., Amit, R., 2003. Learning about failure: bankruptcy, firm age, and the resource-
based view. Organization Science 14 (5), 497-509. 
Turner, J.D., Hickson, C.R., McCann, C., 2005. Much ado about nothing: the limitation of 
liability and the market for 19th century Irish bank stock. Explorations in Economic History 
42 (3), 459-476. 
Van der Bie, R.J., Smits, J.-P., 2001. Tweehonderd jaar statistied in tijdkeeksen, 1800-1999. 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voorburg. 
(1920) . Van Oss' effectenboek. Van Oss, S. F. (ed.). P. Noordhoff, Groningen. 
(1921) . Van Oss' effectenboek. Van Oss, S. F. (ed.). P. Noordhoff, Groningen. 
Van Overfelt, W., Annaert, J., De Ceuster, M., Deloof, M., 2009. Do universal banks create 
value? Universal bank affiliation and company performance in Belgium, 1905-1909. 
Explorations in Economics History 46 (2), 253-265. 
Van Zanden, J.L., 1997a. The Economic History of the Netherlands 1914-1995: A Small Open 
Economy in the ‘Long’ Twentieth Century. Routledge, London. 
Van Zanden, J.L., 1997b. Oldrules, new conditions, 1914-1940. In: ’t Hart, M., Jonker, J., van 
Zanden, J.L. (Eds.), A Financial History of the Netherlands. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp. 124-151. 
35B_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
70 
 
Verrijn Stuart, G.M., 1921. Bankpolitiek. Het Bankwezen. Uitgeversmaatschappij v/h 
Delwel, Amsterdam. 
Westerman, W.M., 1920. De concentratie in het bankwezen: Een bijdrage tot de kennis der 
economische ontwikkeling van onzen tijd. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. 
White, E.N., 1986. Before the Glass-Steagall Act: an analysis of the investment banking 
activities of National Banks. Explorations in Economic History 23 (1), 33-55. 
Wibaut, F.M., 1913. De nieuwste ontwikkeling van het kapitalisme. Scheltema and Holkema’s 
Boekhandel, Amsterdam. 
Zeff, S.A., van der Wel, F., Camfferman, K., 1992. Company Financial Reporting: A 
Comparative and Historical Study of the Dutch Regulatory Process. North-Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
Zmijewski, M.E., 1984. Methodological issues related to the estimation of financial distress 
prediction models. Journal of Accounting Research 22 (S), 59-82. 
  
36A_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
71 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Big linkers and corporate policies and performance: Dutch 
evidence from the 20th century 40 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Dutch business in the previous century was characterized by both family businesses and large 
multinationals. Westerhuis and De Jong (2015) describe that Dutch directors were the relatively 
important, vis-à-vis corporate owners, in setting corporate policies during the twentieth 
century. With assigned legal and statutory powers, directors had the responsibility to design 
and execute a firms’ strategy. David and Westerhuis (2014) show that this power was 
concentrated in the hands of a select group of individuals with seats on multiple boards, so-
called big linkers. This concentration may be because of a scarcity of good directors or caused 
by the value of relations between firms via directors with multiple seats. In this chapter we 
investigate the impact of big linkers in Dutch firms over the course of the twentieth century.  
Prior research has shown that a substantial variation in corporate policies can be 
explained by individual board members (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Richardson et al., 2014). 
Their findings fits with common views on the role of board members. Their primary duties are 
providing advice (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Westphal, 1999), monitoring (Fama, 1980; 
Bainbridge, 1993; Johnson, et al., 1996) and strategizing (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Kesner 
and Johnson, 1990). Studies such as Carpenter and Westphal (2001) find that directors with 
multiple appointments can provide relevant strategic knowledge and show that the directors’ 
social network is an important part of corporate policies. Carpenter et al. (2012) describes the 
                                                          
40 This chapter has greatly benefited from comments by Joost Jonker, Oscar Gelderblom, Chris Colvin and John Turner. We thank seminar 
participants of the Economic History Seminar, Queen’s University Belfast; European Group for Organizational Studies, Rotterdam; Business 
History Group, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Financial History Group, Radboud University Nijmegen, and King’s College, Cambridge 
University. 
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various dimensions along which these well-connected directors can have an impact on 
corporate performance. Directors are able to wield power thanks to their social capital (e.g. 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), actively use their networks to advance corporate interests (e.g. 
Bian, 1997) or close structural gaps in corporate networks using their experience and social 
capital (e.g. Burt, 2001).   
However, studies into the effect of board members with multiple directorships on 
corporate performance show mixed evidence (see Ferris et al (2003), Harris and Shimizu 
(2004), Fich and Shivdasani (2006) or Andress et al. (2013)). In this chapter, we take a broader 
view in understanding the impact of individual directors. We investigate impact of directors on 
corporate policies and how their personal traits and network characteristics can explain this 
impact. We argue that the measurement of impact and the understanding of the effects requires 
a mixed-method approach (Small, 2011). We distinguish two complementary methods, i.e. 
statistical analysis and prosopographical research. We measure the effects of big linkers using 
statistical regression modelling and subsequently we use archival and bibliographical research 
to describe the backgrounds of those big linkers that are found to have a significant 
contribution, as in prosopographical research.  
Using a unique dataset with information on board ties between exchange listed 
corporations in the Netherlands over the period 1903-2003 (5,217 firm-year observations and 
in total 37,582 board seats). From this data we then identify 266 big linkers, i.e. individuals 
with three or more board seats in any given year. We then match our big linkers to a dataset 
containing financial statements and governance information. Our mixed-method approach 
consists of three steps. First, by using binominal choice models we describe which firms choose 
to employ a big linker. Second, using OLS-regressions with director fixed effects we describe 
the evolution of big linkers in explaining cross-sectional variation in corporate policies and 
financial performance over the period. From these results we are able to assess the individual 
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contribution of the 266 big linkers in our sample. Third, we provide a historical context to our 
findings by providing biographical details in combination with descriptions on the various 
dimensions as defined by Carpenter et al. (2012).  
By employing a mixed method research design we are able to combine quantitative 
research (statistical modelling) with qualitative research (biographical descriptions) using 
secondary sources. The advantages of this approach are threefold: (1) we are able to provide a 
historical context to the empirical findings, taking advantage of the strengths and mitigating 
the weaknesses of either methodology (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003); (2) it allows us to infer 
some degree of causality from detailed historical context, examine different narratives allowing 
us to connect the dots (Morck and Yeung, 2011); (3) it allows us to be inclusive of local and 
broader individual, societal and institutional realities (Johnson et al., 2007). 
We contribute to the Dutch historiography by describing the importance of big linkers 
and their evolution over the twentieth century. In addition, by using director fixed effects, we 
are able to assess the extent to which history has adequately attributed power and influence to 
prominent Dutch individuals such as K.P van der Mandele (banker and chairman of the 
Chamber of Commerce) or E. Heldring (banker and president of the Nederlandsche Handels 
Maatschappij). Additionally we contribute to a large body of literature. First, we extend the 
literature on corporate governance. Studies such as Helmers et al. (1975), Granovetter, (1985), 
Davis (1991), Haunschild (1993) and Heemskerk (2009) usually measure the impact of board 
members as averages across individuals, we assess their impact on an individual level. Second, 
we complement the literature on corporate networks, as much of the research on corporate 
networks is descriptive and our mixed method research design allows us to incorporate 
historical context with empirical analysis. Third, we contribute to the literature on fixed effects 
models. By examining the similarities of corporate policies across firms by looking at big 
linkers, we solve the difficulty to separate firm and director’s effects on corporate policies 
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because they are almost always observed together. We do so by employing fixed effects 
models, similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Richardson et al. (2004) and Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach (2009).  
Section 2 briefly describes the various steps in our research. Section 3 describes the 
research setting and data collection, including the descriptive statistics. In Section 4 we 
estimate big linkers effects and provide an assessment of the explanatory power of these effects. 
In Section 5 we discuss the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
In this section we highlight the different components to our research design. Using data on 
board members of Dutch exchange listed corporations over the period 1903-2003 (including 
the fifty largest financial institutions), we identify the big linkers in our sample. In the literature 
it is common to define big linkers as directors that have three or more board positions (David 
and Westerhuis, 2014). Given our objective to assess if big linkers have a systematic 
contribution to corporate policies we extend the aforementioned definition. We define a big 
linker as an individual who has more than two board positions in any given year and nine or 
more positions in his entire career.41 Based on this definition we identify 266 big linkers. Table 
1 shows the top fifteen board members that fit this definition, of which the total number of 
positions ranges from 51 (W. Westerman) to 126 (K.P. van der Mandele). 
We then estimate what type of firm is more likely to have a big linker on board. We use 
a binominal choice model to assess the determinants of firms having a big linker on their board. 
We execute this analysis in order to understand why firms hire well-connected directors. We 
argue that only stronger firms (i.e. larger firms) are able to attract the most powerful board 
members. However this implies that there is an endogenous selection observed in the effect 
                                                          
41 Our analysis shows that there are no female big linkers in de Dutch corporate network during the twentieth century. 
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individual big linkers may have on corporate policies and performance. Formula 1 represents 
our estimation, where ܻ is the binominal indicator of having a big linker on the board at time 
t, ܨ௜ǡ௧ିଵ is a vector of lagged firm characteristics (firm size, dividend payment, current ratio, 
leverage, tangibility, growth, profitability, board size), ߱௧ is a vector of year fixed effects to 
control for unobserved macroeconomic shocks, ߠ௜ǡ௧ is a vector of industry fixed effects to 
control for unobserved industry specific characteristics. These estimations use robust standard 
errors. 
ܮ݋݃௘
ߨ௜ǡ௧ሺܻሻ
ͳ െߨ௜ǡ௧ሺܻሻ
ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵܨ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ߚଶ߱௧ ൅ߚଷߠ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ (1) 
Third, we assess the explanatory power of the big linker effects, based on a sequence 
of regressions. We investigate how much of the variability in firm’s policies and performance 
(the outcome) is explained by big linker fixed effects, after controlling for other variables 
explaining these outcomes, where we include firm characteristics, year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects.  
Formula 2 through 4 highlight our OLS-estimations, where ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜ǡ௧ are firm specific 
policy and performance variables,   ܨ௜ǡ௧ିଵ is a vector of firm characteristics (firm size, dividend 
payment, current ratio, leverage, tangibility, growth, profitability, board size), ߱௧ is a vector of 
year fixed effects to control for unobserved macroeconomic shocks, ߠ௜ǡ௧ is a vector of industry 
fixed effects to control for unobserved industry specific characteristics. We subsequently add 
a vector ܤ௜ǡ௧ capturing firm specific board characteristics and finally we add vector ܯ௜ǡ௧ 
capturing board member (big linker) fixed effects. To allow for time variation in the firm and 
industry determinants we interact these vectors with ߬௧ which is a vector of period five period 
fixed effects.42 All estimations include robust standard errors. 
                                                          
42 The five periods are, 1908-1923, 1928-1942, 1948-1963, 1968-1983 and 1988-2003. 
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ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵܨ௜ǡ௧߬௧ ൅ ߚଶ߱௧ ൅ߚଷߠ௜ǡ௧߬௧ ൅ߝ௜ǡ௧ (2) 
ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵܨ௜ǡ௧߬௧ ൅ ߚଶ߱௧ ൅ߚଷߠ௜ǡ௧߬௧ ൅ ߚସܤ௜ǡ௧߬௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ (3) 
ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵܨ௜ǡ௧߬௧ ൅ߚଶ߱௧ ൅ߚଷߠ௜ǡ௧߬௧ ൅ ߚସܤ௜ǡ௧߬௧ ൅ߚସܯ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ (4) 
We use base-line OLS regressions for 12 firm policies and performance variables and for 20 
bench mark years. We calculate the coefficient of determination (R-squared) per cross section, 
which measures the explained variance relative to total variance. The larger the increase of the 
R-squared in a cross section when big linker fixed effects are added, the larger the importance 
of these fixed effects. Although we estimate our model as a single panel, we calculate the R-
squared for each of the twenty cross sections. This is particularly relevant, because it allows us 
to show the importance of big linkers over the century.43 44 
Fourth, using formula 4 (vector ܯ௜ǡ௧) we rank individual directors using the t-statistics 
pertaining to the individual big linker coefficients. The advantage of ranking based on t-
statistics the effects are then standardized and made comparable. We subsequently provide 
short biographical descriptions of the big linkers found most relevant for the different policies 
and corporate performance. In order to explain the systematic relevance of our big linkers we 
highlight individual traits, attributes, corporate commitments and describe the characteristics 
of the corporations these individuals.  
 
 
                                                          
43 Two assumptions are made. Big linker effects are constant over all firm-year-positions (robustness for positions), and effects are measured 
with other boards as benchmark, that’s the zero’s for the big linkers not active in a firm and for directors that are not big linkers. The effects 
are sophisticated correlations that are constant for directors over all seats they occupy. Thus an effect might be called a “style” a director has 
(see also Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). 
44 Also important to bear in mind is that our estimates in step three are correlations because all inputs are measured contemporaneously. The 
correlation can be driven by selection (matching directors with the goals of a firm)  or by influence (directors indeed influence outcomes) 
(Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009). 
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3.3 The research setting and data 
Our research is based on big linkers in Dutch listed firms during the 20th century. Dutch 
business can be characterized by a long tradition of entrepreneurship and large multinationals.  
Over the century, periods of stability were followed by disruption. Crises, world wars, and 
globalization are examples of exogenous factors that challenged Dutch business. Following the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice, 2003), one could say that the Netherlands 
swung from a liberal market economy in the beginning of the 20th century, towards a 
coordinated market economy after the Second World War, and reverted back again to a more 
liberal one since the 1980s (for more details on Dutch capitalism see Sluyterman (2015)). Dutch 
directors are described to have considerable influence relative to firms’ owners, only to decline 
somewhat since the 1990s and especially in the early 21th century (Westerhuis and De Jong, 
2015).  
The Dutch corporate network emerged at the end of 19th century when industrialization 
began to take hold and the economy grew rapidly. Firms were created and many of them were 
listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. A temporarily decline of the network in the 1930s 
was followed by a period of consolidation in the 1950s to 1970s. Since the 1980s the network 
gradually declined, and more significantly at the turn of the century,  when the number of board 
positions held by directors declined substantially (Westerhuis, 2014). This general trend from 
emergence, to consolidation, and then to decline of the network is very similar to other national 
networks, such as in the US, Germany, and Switzerland although the pace of the decline and 
the explaining factors differed across countries (David and Westerhuis, 2014). 
Dutch firms have a two-tier system, consisting of an Executive Board and a Supervisory 
Board. During the 20th century all listed firms included both boards, although a supervisory 
board became mandatory only in 1971 (structured regime), and only for large firms. For the set 
of non-financial firms we collected the names of the directors of both boards between 1908 and 
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2003 with five-year intervals.  And we did the same for another set of 50 largest financial firms, 
both listed and non-listed. Next, we collected annual report information of all Dutch listed non-
financial firms between 1903 and 2003 with five-year intervals. We excluded the financial 
firms due to differences in accounting principles.  With this dataset we calculated firm size, 
performance (return on assets and return on equity) and 10 different firm policies (see for the 
definitions Appendix). 
Based on the data sets described above we created three samples. One sample with all 
Dutch listed non-financial firms for which we collected complete annual report data between 
1908 and 2003 with five-year intervals (of 3,564 firm-year observations). A second sample 
with all Dutch listed non-financial and the 50 largest financial firms for which we collected 
complete board data between 1903 and 2003 with five-year intervals (5,217 firm-year 
observations with 37,582 board seats). And, a third sample consists of 266 big linkers including 
personal background information such as age, belonging to elite families, education, bank 
involvement and network statistics. The descriptive statistics of 266 big linkers are shown in 
Table 2. On average the 266 big linkers have 25 board positions, 68% is a banker, 14% belong 
to an elite family, 12% is or has been political active and 21% has a university degree. 
Based on the second sample, we calculate the number of board positions taken by the 
big linkers. As can be seen in Figure 6, the number of board seats taken by big linkers followed 
a similar pattern as the overall network: increase (until 1928), temporarily decline (in the 
1930s), and consolidation (1950s-1960s), and decline (since 1970s). The different development 
between number of big linkers (declining already since the 1970s) and number of big linkers 
per firm (declining only since the late 1990s) can be explained by the diminishing number of 
firms in our sample. The relative late decline of big linkers per firm is consistent with the 
literature, in which it is shown that the Dutch network only declined significantly at turn of the 
century (Westerhuis 2014).  
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Figure 4: Number of board seat of big linkers over the period 1908-2003 
Table 3A shows descriptive statistics of consisting of 3,564 firm-year observations. Over the 
whole century, on average 57% of the firms has a big linker on board, with an average board 
size of 7.3 directors. A big linker has on average 8.3 interlocks of which 0.9 with non-financial 
firms. The second part of the table shows the firm policies. Table 3B shows averages for five 
different periods. It shows that after the second world war the percentage big linkers increased 
slightly to around 61%, and then since the late 1980s started to decline to 48%. Board size 
increases from around 7 until 1963 to around 8 in the last two periods, whereas the total board 
interlocks decreases from 10.1 in the period 1903-1923 to 5.7 in the period 1988-2003. The 
average firm size increases a little until 1942, and considerably as of the 1960s, which is 
consistent with the extant literature (see e.g. Westerhuis and De Jong, 2015).  
Next, we estimate what type of firms – characterized by size, performance, growth, 
leverage and board size –, are more likely to have a big linker on board. As Table 4 shows in 
each period during the 20th century larger firms are more likely to have a big linker. Also board 
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size has a positive relation with big linkers in the periods 1928-1942; 1948-1963; and 1968-
1983. This finding is consistent Ferris et al (2003), who stated that directors who serve larger 
firms and sit on larger board are more likely to attract board positions. Combined with the 
aforementioned finding on firm size it supports the idea individuals sitting in the board of larger 
corporations, with larger boards add to their reputation. 
Additionally our analysis highlights two interesting facts. First, we find that that in the 
period 1928-1942, asset tangibility has a significantly negative predictive ability for the 
presence of big linkers. We argue that, during this period, there was a substitution effect 
between the skills of particular big linkers and the functions of asset tangibility. A possible 
explanation could be the recuperation of Dutch economy from the 1920s financial crisis. 
Chapter two of this dissertation and Jonker (1996) attribute the severity of this crisis to the 
intertwinedness of corporations and the banking sector. Here we argue that our result highlights 
a change in dominant logic, where the function of collateral shifted from director and banker 
reputation to more material corporate assets. Second, we find that during the period 1913-1928 
corporate profitability positively predicts the presence of a big linker. This finding is consistent 
with the idea that at the turn of the twentieth century Dutch business men (especially bankers) 
collectively aimed to increase their power (Wibaut, 1913; Jonker, 1989). As such big linkers 
were primarily positioned at large and profitable corporations. We also find that profitability 
is an important determinant in the last two periods. In the period 1968-1983, we find that less 
profitable firms had at least one big linker on their board. The period, characterised by oil crises 
and severe turmoil on the Dutch housing market, had a negative impact on especially the largest 
corporations such as Koninklijke Olie Shell. As such the economic cycle fits as an explanation 
for the observed negative effect. In the last period, 1988-2003, the Dutch economy reverted 
back to a more liberal market economy, changing the market for corporate control. We argue 
that a shift in dominant logic again changed the hiring policy of Dutch firms. At this point in 
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time only the best performing companies are able to attract those board members that are 
(assumed) to be the best. This finding is consistent with Sluyterman (2015) and Westerhuis and 
De Jong (2015). 
 
3.4 Measuring big linker effects 
We estimate big linker effects by separating the firm effects from the individual effects. We 
investigate how much of the variability in firm’s policies (outcome) is explained by director 
fixed effects after controlling for variables explaining these outcomes, where we include firm 
characteristics (determinant) and industry fixed effects (industry) (See formulas 2 to 4 in 
Section 3). Because of the panel nature of our data, we need to deal with the time dimension. 
We do so by estimating a single model for the full 20 cross-sections, and (i) including 20 year-
fixed effects to capture variation in the outcome variables, which is caused by time effects and 
(ii) interacting the Determinant, Industry and Board-characteristic variables with five period 
indicators for 1903-1923, 1928-1943, 1948-1963, 1968-1983 and 1988-2003. We do not allow 
the director fixed effects to vary over time, because the length of the presence of a director in 
the sample is limited, such that director fixed effects are estimated over a maximum number of 
cross-sections. 
The results of the estimations are a set of regression coefficients measuring the 
correlations between outcome variables and director characteristics, controlling for firm, 
industry and year characteristics. We calculate the coefficient of determination (R-squared) per 
cross section for models (2) to (4). This coefficient measures the explained variance relative to 
the total variance. The larger the increase of the R-squared in a cross section when director 
characteristics and director fixed effects are added, the larger the importance of these 
characteristics. The results are shown in Table 6 and Figure 2. Table 6 shows the explanatory 
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power of the big linker effect, which is the difference between formula 4 and 3 and reflects the 
dotted line in figure 7.45  
 
Figure 5: The effect of big linkers (per year) for corporate policies as measured by the outcome variables (mean) 
 
Overall it shows that board characteristics do not improve the model substantially, 
whereas the big linkers fixed effect do improve the model fit. The average percentage fluctuates 
around 8-9% and is lower at the beginning and in the end of the 20th century whereas in 1928 
and in the 1980s it is at its highest. In particular the relatively high explanatory power in the 
1980s is interesting, because by then big linkers occupied far less positions (see Figure 6). We 
find that big linker fixed effect does improve the model that explains variances in corporate 
policies and performance, we zoom in into the big linkers fixed effects.  
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3.5 Understanding big linker effects 
Our estimations are correlations, which means that the effects can be driven by either selection 
(i.e. matching) or influence. Thus big linker fixed effects might indeed reflect influence on 
policy and performance variables. It would mean that a big linker influences policies in the 
same way across different firms where he has a board position. He beliefs that this will enhance 
firm value. However, big linker fixed effect can also reflect that firms that want to reach certain 
goals actively select directors to do the job. In other words, the firm is already heading in a 
certain direction and matches the best director available to help out. The first might lead to 
inefficient policies imposed by influential directors; the latter to optimal or at least intended 
policies with the right director at the right job (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 2009). 
An example of big linker fixed effects is shown in Table 5. We included 5 big linkers, 
each with different characteristics, and regressed them on leverage (one of the 12 policies).  
C.J.K. van Aalst (in our sample in 1908-1918) was active in the oil industry, trade and shipping 
industry. K.P. van de Mandele (1918-1963) had many board positions in the light industry 
(cigars, packing and wood) and important multinationals such as Unilever and Stork. C.J.P. 
van Westreenen (1973-1993) had board positions at ABN AMRO bank, Bijenkorf, Aalberts 
and Super de Boer. S.P. van Eeghen (1903-1933). Van Eeghen had a prominent position in 
Amsterdam, where together with his brother in law, he pulled the strings in the financial and 
business world (F.J.E. van Lennep in Late regenten (Haarlem, 1962)).  Westreenen shows a 
significant positive correlation whereas the other three big linkers show only limited impact on 
leverage. We interpret these findings as follows. Firms where Van Westreenen was in the board 
had approximately 11% more leverage when compared to firms where he was not a board 
member. We may attribute this finding to Van Westreenen’s ability to secure capital through 
his bank connections or his role as a monitor for banks in highly indebted banks. 
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Table 7 presents three panels. Panel A shows the absolute values of the effects of our 
biggest linkers from Table 1. We find that relatively few exhibit systematic effects. Only two 
of the biggest linkers have an absolute effect which is statistically significantly difference from 
zero with a ninety percent confidence interval: E. Heldring (t-value of 1.64) and J.F. de 
Beaufort (t-value of 1.58). The general finding that the biggest linkers exhibit little systematic 
effects is consistent with the literature on busy directors, which highlights that the directors 
with the most commitments are not by definition the once that have the highest contribution to 
corporate policies and performance. A precautionary note is in order here as it might be possible 
for the most powerful big linkers to adapt to corporate needs. This implies that these particular 
individuals do not have a certain management style, rather they are well-equipped to meet 
targets set for their appointment. 
Panel B of Table 7 shows the top 15 big linkers with the highest absolute fixed effects 
from our regressions. Our most influential big linkers exhibit an absolute correlation with 
corporate policies and performance t-values ranging from 1.6 to 1.9. To understand these 
effects we follow Carpenter et al. (2012) and define four categories along which we explain 
our findings. First, we distinguish big linkers with high or low social capital. We make a 
systematic division between personal and corporate social capital. Big linkers have a high 
personal social capital when they are connected to other important directors (e.g. E. Heldring), 
are from elite families (e.g. J. A. van Veen Kretschmar)  or they are prominent business owners 
(e.g. L. Stokvis). Big linkers have high corporate social capital when they have board positions 
at large and influential multinational corporations. For example A. H. J. Kruising had board 
positions at Akzo (predecessor of Akzo Nobel) and Koninklijke BAM. Second, we investigate 
if big linkers have the ability to advance corporate interest. Big linkers with positions at banks 
can have the ability to increase the access to financing (for example W.R. Esser had board 
positions at Uni-Bank in the Dutch Indies, providing corporations such as Singkep Tin-
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Maatschappij with access to funds). Third, we aim to find in our sources which big linkers have 
management experience, for example when they have multiple directorships as opposed to 
supervisory positions over the time span during which they were are classified as big linker. 
Fourth, we investigate if big linkers  that are more centrally located  in the Dutch network use 
their position to wield power and are better able to reap the benefits from their network.  
Panel B shows that fact half of the most influential big linkers were active before 
Second World War: L. Stokvis (1923-1938), W.R. Esser (1908-1928), F. H. Fentener van 
Vlissingen (1923-1958), J. A. van Veen Kretschmar (1908-1928) and E. Heldring (1908-1948). 
Less known are P. Leeuwen Boomkamp (1913-1942) and P.E. Tegelberg (1908-1953). When 
we combine our findings, with the classification from Carpenter et al. (2012) we find the 
following. Prior to the Second World War the most influential big linkers were characterized 
by high personal social capital as opposed to corporate social capital, high experience. After 
the Second World War experience became less important for big linkers, however their 
network (and especially their centrality) became more important. 
The big linker with the highest overall contribution, L. Stokvis, was well known for his 
ownership of multiple shipping companies, exhibits a striking management style. We find that 
companies where Stokvis was a board member had systematically lower leverage (t-statistic: -
1.5), invested less in fixed assets (-6.9) and were more liquid (1.6). It was Stokvis’ 
entrepreneurial spirit that made him risk averse, as he was personally liable for adverse shocks 
to his corporations. Stokvis quickly gained substantial social capital as his shipping companies 
became more successful. It was through his experience of managing his companies in turbulent 
times (1920s and 1930s) that he was able to build his empire. However we find that the 
companies where he was a director provided (on average) a very low return on equity 
(approximately 2.8% less than other companies).  
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In second place we find C.J.P. van Westreenen, although he is one of the big linkers 
with the least board positions, his contributions are highly significant. Van Westreenen was 
very able to advance the corporate interests of the retail companies where he was a board 
member. His positions at Amro (legal predecessor of ABN Amro) enabled him a secure funds 
for the various corporations in his portfolio. We find that his companies had on average 8.6% 
more leverage, invested significantly more in their fixed assets and operated approximately 
11% more efficiently. His experience and the corporate social capital allowed Van Westrenen 
to contribute significantly to the equity return of the firms in his portfolio. We find that 
companies where he was a board member generated a return on equity which was 
approximately 10% higher than that of other firms. 
Third, P. E. van Leeuwen Boomkamp. Although he is relatively unknown in the Dutch 
historiography, he held a multitude of positions at shipping and rubber companies both in the 
Netherlands and in the Dutch Indies. As many of his contemporaries, Leeuwen Boomkamp 
went to the Openbare Handelsschool in Amsterdam after which he got experience and 
knowledge by internships at various firms between 1889-1892. In 1892 he started at his father’s 
firm Leeuwen Boomkamp & Co, at which he became a partner in 1898. He created many 
cultuuurondernemingen, among them Rubber Cultuur Maatschappij Amsterdam. His overseas 
positions at these companies limited his domestic exposure, limiting his corporate social 
capital. However his multitude of positions with shipping companies and trade corporations 
gave him the capital to found various overseas rubber, tobacco and coffee producing firms. In 
contrast to entrepreneurs such as Stokvis, Van Leeuwen Boomkamp was more risk seeking, 
his companies were significantly more levered and invested less in their assets. We find that 
his management experience and eventually his central location in the network of did not 
contribute to the performance (return on equity or return on assets) of the companies in his 
portfolio. 
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Of the big linkers with the highest overall contribution we discuss two other individuals. 
Frederik Hendrik Fentener van Vlissingen (1882-1962) was an entrepreneur and was married 
to Sophie Schout Velthuys (1882–1976), who came from a wealthy banking family (Bank 
Vlaer & Kol, later it became part of AMRO Bank). He received his education at the 
Polytechnical School in Delft in 1900 but had to quit when he his father died in 1904. Soon 
after he got a position in the family firm, Steenkolen Handels Vereeniging (SHV). He moved 
the firms’ headquarters from Rotterdam to Utrecht in front of its biggest customer Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen (NS). In 1911 he became director of the family business. Already in he was one 
of the creators of N.V. Hollandsche Kunstzijde-Industrie which was one of the predecessors of 
AKZO. Later he collected capital to finance the start-up of the Koninklijke Luchtvaart 
Maatschappij in 1919. From 1918 till 1933 Fentener van Vlissing was among the advisors of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Having taken part in trade negatiations for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs during the 1920s, he quickly gained a reputation as an economic expert and 
talented diplomat. Den Tex (2013) describes Fentener van Vlissingen as highly analytical and 
pragmatic. Coming from a large merchant family Van Vlissingen quickly increased his 
influence throughout the Netherlands. Driven by ambition and his entrepreneurial spirit he 
always recognised good business opportunities, with his corporate and social status he was able 
to maximize on these opportunities. Although we do not find that he significantly contributed 
to the return of the companies in his portfolio, we find that his firms were very efficient in their 
production (net working capital t-statistic: -3.2) and his firms operated with relatively low 
amounts of fixed assets (t-statistic: -3.8). Overall we classify Fentener van Vlissingen as a 
highly skilled big linker with no particular management style, as a is much more driven by case 
by case opportunities and the experience of a man from a family of reputable merchants. 
B. Th. (Barthold Theodoor Willem) van Hasselt (1896-1960) was son of doctor dr. 
Sjoerd Folkert Willem van Hasselt (1868-1934). He studied law at Leiden University and 
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obtained his PhD for a dissertation entitled “De literatuur over het wetsontwerp op de 
Naamlooze Vennootschappen, critisch samengevat” in Leiden  in 1919, after which he got a 
position at NV Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot exploitatie van Petroleumbronnen 
in Nederlands-Indië. In the Dutch-Indies he also got a position at the Bataafse Petroleum 
Maatschappij, and he became banker at Javasche Bank. In 1934 he was elected in the Volkraad 
Nederlands-Indie and as such member of the Economic Group. By then Van Hasselt was 
known as an industrialist and soon became director at Koninklijke Olie in 1944 and in 1948 
director-general. In 1951 he resigned after which he occupied many supervisory positions at 
for example AKZO and Hoogovens. Wynaendts van Resandt (1933) describes the roots of the 
Van Hasselt famility. Dating back to at least the thirteenth century, the Van Hasselt family can 
be classified as a nobel family holding important governmental posts in Keulen (Germany). As 
such it is no surprise that B. Th. van Hasselt is found to be one of the highest contributing big 
linkers. We find that Van Hasselt exhibits a particular management style, characterized by a 
focus on profitability (return on assets t-statistic: 2.3), efficiency (net working capital t-statistic:  
-3.4) and risk aversion (leverage t-statistic: -2.3). Although non-significant, we find that firms 
in his portfolio invested approximately 8% more and grew at a rate 23% higher than firms 
where he was not a board member. We argue that the combination of his network centrality, 
and social capital allowed him to maximize rents across the firms in his portfolio. 
Panel B demonstrates the 15 most influential big linkers with an absolute correlation 
with corporate policies and performance ranging from 1.62 to 1.92. When we compare panel 
A, B and C we can conclude that the most central directors are not the most influential ones. 
Only Ernst Heldring appears in both tables, meaning that he is one of the 15 biggest linkers 
and that he has an absolute effect on corporate policies and performance. Heldring (1871-1954) 
was a very active entrepreneur and ship owner before the Second World War. Heldring’s 
eductation (Public Trade School Amsterdam), his travels abroad and internships at various 
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trade offices in both London and Amsterdam quickly shaped his career path. He established 
the Java-China-Java line, was director at Koninklijkse Nederlandse Stoomboot-Maatschappij 
from 1899 to 1937, and president of the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij between 1939 
and 1948. He was the frontrunner of the Chamber of Commerce in Amsterdam in the 1930s, 
and between 1938 and 1946 member of the First Chamber. Heldring was known for his sense 
of responsibility and integrity. Moreover he was revered for his broad interest in the arts and 
sciences and respected for his confidence and restraint in the face of hardship (De Vries, 1970). 
Heldring’s experience, and centrality in the Dutch network of board members makes him in all 
likelihood one of the most influential individuals of the century. Not only was we a board 
member of many large multinational corporations his management style is also very explicit. 
We find that although Heldring’s firms paid out a significantly lower proportion of their profits, 
his firms were more financially flexible (current ratio t-statistic: 1.8) and also more highly 
levered (leverage t-statistic: 1.8). Firms in Heldring’s portfolio yielded a return on assets 
approximately 3% above that of firms where Heldring was not a board member. We argue that 
Heldring used his social capital, experience and utilized his network to take advantage of 
opportunities, which required financial flexibility, effectively balancing investments and 
payouts (for which we find no significant effects). 
From Panel C we observe that those big linkers with the highest contribution to 
corporate performance where primarily directors of non-financial corporations and held 
supervisory positions at various banks. We find that their network centrality is not very 
different than that of the top fifteen big linkers with the overall highest contribution (panel B). 
However both the number of bank positions and director positions are substantially higher than 
the big linkers from panel B. This can be interpreted as evidence that big linkers that have also 
focus their efforts on generating returns for shareholders, conditional on the power of their 
network. 
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Another interesting observation is that the two big linkers with the highest effect on 
corporate policies and performance are from different time periods. Thus, L. Stokvis (1.9) was 
active in the interwar years, whereas C.J.P. Westreenen (1.8) in the period 1973-1993. Both 
were not very centrally located in the network (20 and 31% respectively). This finding 
highlights that, although the majority of big linkers are concentrated in the era prior to the 
Second World War, our analysis does not constrain us from finding important effects in periods 
during which corporate networks declined. Additionally Table 8 highlights the following: (1) 
big linkers with the highest overall contribution, are characterized by high personal social 
capital and extensive management experience; (2) corporate social capital became much more 
important following the Second World War; (3) after the Second World War the importance of 
the big linkers centrality in the Dutch network increased.  
Our finding shows interesting patterns. We show that the directors with the highest 
systematic relevance for corporate policies are not by definition those who are central in the 
Dutch network. Nor are they the ones with the most connections, rather we argue that they are 
well-connected and have substantial management experience. We show that the individuals 
with systematic relevance are not descendants from nobility, rather they come from merchant 
families. We find that the relevance of big linkers and their contribution in explaining corporate 
policies and performance is larger after periods of economic turmoil. Additionally we find that 
throughout the twentieth century bankers have played an important role in shaping corporate 
policies. In addition to these patterns we find many effects specific to firms and individual 
directors, which underlines the importance of our mixed-method approach. 
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3.6 Conclusions  
This paper investigates the effects of individual directors on corporate policies and firm 
performance. For directors with many executive and supervisory roles in multiple firms’ so-
called big linkers we estimate whether the presence of these individuals is systematically 
related with corporate policies and performance.  
We show that Dutch corporate networks changed over time consistent with David and 
Westerhuis (2014). Generally it is assumed that firms or directors that are most centrally 
located in the network have potential to wield power (e.g. Helmers et al 1975; Granovetter 
1985, Heemskerk 2009).  We show that the 266 Dutch big linkers had on average 25 board 
positions, 68% is a banker, 14% belong to an elite family, 12% is or has been political active 
and 21% has a university degree. 
Following Bertrand and Schoar (2003), we use director fixed effect to estimate the 
effect or ‘style’ of the big linkers in our sample and to assess their importance during the period. 
We find that over the course of the 20th century for Dutch exchange-listed firms, big linkers 
matter and explain a substantial part of the variation in firm corporate policies and performance. 
We estimate that the contribution in explaining corporate policy throughout the twentieth 
century is between 4% and 11%.  
Using archival sources and biographical details we provide an overview of the big 
linkers that were found to have a significant effect on corporate policies over the twentieth 
century. We find that the directors with the highest systematic relevance for corporate policies 
are not by definition those who are central in the Dutch network. Nor are they the ones with 
the most connections, rather we argue that they are well-connected and have substantial 
management experience. Additionally our analysis inspired by Carpenter et al. (2012) shows 
that big linkers with the highest overall contribution, are characterized by high personal social 
capital and extensive management experience. We find that corporate social capital became 
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much more important following the Second World War. After the Second World War the 
importance of the big linkers centrality in the Dutch network increased. This line of research 
opens new avenues for research that combines historical or archival sources in combination 
with empirical analysis. 
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Appendix: Definitions of variables 
 
 
Variable name Unit Definition
Big linker (dummy) Dummy
Equals 1 if and only if the firm has a board member who has 
more than 2 board positions in any given year and 9 or more 
positions in his entire career
Payout ratio Continuous Total dividends paid to net income
Liquid assets Continuous Current assets minus inventory to total assets
Leverage Continuous Debt to total assets
Investments Continuous Change in fixed assets
Asset growth Continuous Change in total assets
Return on equity Continuous Net income to total equity
Return on assets Continuous Net income to total assets
Market-to-book Continuous Market value of equity to nominal equity value
Retained profits Continuous Equity reserves and retained earnings to total assets
Interest coverage Continuous Gross profits to interest paid
Firm size  (milions and inflation 
corrected, 2003 base year)
Continuous Total assets (ln)
Tangibility Continuous Fixed assets to total assets
Conservatism Dummy
Equals 1 if and only if the firm rapidly writes down its asset to a 
value below 10 guilders
Net working capital Continuous Current assets minus short-term debt to total assets
Quick ratio Continuous Current assets minus inventory to short-term debt
Current ratio Continuous Current assets to short-term debt
Boardsize Continuous Number of board members
Total interlocks Continuous Total number of interlocking directorates
Total firm interlocks Continuous Total number of interlocking directorates with non-financials
Total bank interlocks Continuous Total number of interlocking directorates with financials
Network centrality Continuous Degree centality (Newman, 2010)
47B_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
94 
 
Appendix: Description of other influential big linkers 
 
Jacob Adriaan Kretschmar van Veen (1857-1931) was an engineer and as jonker part 
of the Dutch nobility. He was active particularly in the railroad industry. He became director 
of the Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaanse Spoorweg Maatschappij (NZASM) in 1899, which was 
created by Paul Kruger and Rudolf van den Wall Bake at the end of the 19th century. Because 
of the war with England, Kretschmar Van Veen came back to the Netherlands in 1901, and in 
1909 the NZASM was liquidated. He became directeur-generaal of the Nederlandsche 
Spoorwegen between 1917 and 1921 and president-supervisor between 1921-1927. He was 
also director at Deli Spoorweg Maatschappij. His dealings with the “Vryheidsoorloë” (wars 
between decendants of Dutch kolonists and the British in South-Africa) and his ability to 
manage crisis situations at the Nederlandsche Spoorwegen, quickly gave him a reputation of 
an expert diplomat (Veenendaal, 2001) 
The other half of the big linkers were mostly active after Second World War: 
Westreenen (1973-1993), J.M. Haga (1948-1963), H.J. Buttinger (1953-1978), L.A. van 
Ittersum (1958-1968), D.F.W. Langelaan (1963-1978) B. Th. van Hasselt (1948-1958), L. 
Speelman (1948-1963), A. H. J. Kruising (1968-1988), of whom only the first and last 
(Westreenen and Kruising) were active in the more recent period. Thus 6 of them were active 
in the period directly after Second World War, when the Dutch economy was recovering,  
Dutch business were growing and Dutch management was gaining power at the expense of 
shareholders. We describe three of these prominent individuals. 
J.M. Haga (Sneek 1891-Amsterdam 1984) was director at Amsterdamsche Bank 
between 1940 and 1956, after which he occupied a position in the Supervisory board of this 
bank until 1963. He was also a director at the Incasso Bank in 1948 and 1949, and had 
supervisory board positions in many cultuurondernemingen. 
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D.F.W. Langelaan was director at Participatie Maatschappij, at Rubber Cultuur 
Maatschappij Amsterdam between 1952-1964, and supervisor at Bank Mees and Hope among 
others. When Rubber Cultuur Maatschappij Amstedam came into financial trouble around 
1973 and 1974, the majority at the extrodinary shareholder meeting  decided to fire both 
directors and Langelaan was appointed  director at the firm, which most important bank relation 
was with Bank Mees and Hope (Reformatorisch Dagblad: 17 March 1975; 16 June 1975). His 
father was professor in Medicines and as such did not belong to the Dutch business elite. 
However Langelaan married into the Lucassen family which had become wealthy in the sugar 
industry in Nederlands-Indie. Following in his father’s footsteps, Langelaan on the board of 
the Vereeniging Nederlandsch Kankerinstituut. Here he was as treasurer active in daily 
management until 1963, and was assisted by a financial committee of three advisors, among 
them banker J.M. Haga. And in 1960 Haga became second treasurer, which he remained until 
1968 (annual report various years). Later, Langelaan married with a member of the important 
banker family Van Eeghen. These findings highlight the intertwinedness, not only of Dutch 
corporations, but also of the Dutch elite families (a finding consistent with Heemskerk (2009)). 
Lastly, table 7C shows the top 15 big linkers with highest correlation with performance, 
measured by return on assets and return on equity, ranging from 1.68 to 3.57. Here we see some 
familiar names. C.J.P. van Westreenen and E. Heldring also appear as most influential on total 
policies. M.C Koning has the highest effect of 3.57 on performance.  Since 1920 he was 
member and between 1937 and 1948 chairman of the executive board of Koninklijke 
Paketvaart-Maatschappij (Uitlaat, Magazine KPM; 1 February 1950). Before that, since 1912 
he was director and since 1916 president-director of the firm in Batavia (Jakarta).  Like Van 
Hasselt he was appointed in the Volksraad Nederlands-Indie around 1918. 
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mean p50 min max
Total number of board positions 25.18 22.00 9.00 126.00
Total number of board positions (at sample firms) 17.14 15.00 9.00 73.00
Banker (dummy) 0.68 1.00 0.00 1.00
Number of bank seats to total seats 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.45
Number of bank management seats to total number of seats 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.27
Number of management seats to total seats 0.15 0.13 0.00 1.00
Biggest big linkers (more than median number of positions) 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00
Elite family 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00
University degree 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00
Educated in Rotterdam 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00
Educated in Amsterdam 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00
Educated in Leiden 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00
Educated in Delft 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00
Educated in Utrecht 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00
Politically active 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00
Active as lawyer 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00
Network centrality 37.94 34.42 10.50 88.86
Tables 
 
Table 1: Biggest linkers (top 15) 
Name First Last 
Total number 
of board 
positions 
Total number 
of board 
positions (at 
sample firms) 
K. P. van der Mandele 1918 1963 126 73 
C. J. K. van Aalst 1908 1938 76 45 
S. P. van Eeghen 1908 1933 71 23 
E. Heldring 1908 1948 67 30 
J. F. de Beaufort 1918 1953 64 18 
H. Cremer 1918 1948 62 27 
H. W. A. van de Wall Bake 1953 1978 60 38 
P. J. van Ommeren 1918 1973 59 43 
J. P. van Tienhoven 1918 1948 58 26 
H. F. van Leeuwen 1938 1968 56 44 
B. E. Ruys 1908 1948 56 34 
F. S. van Nierop 1908 1923 54 29 
A. H. Ingen Housz 1928 1968 53 44 
R. J. H. Patijn 1918 1953 51 27 
W. Westerman 1913 1933 51 30 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of all big linkers (N=266) 
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Table 3A: Descriptive statistics (firm level) 
  N mean p25 p50 p75 sd 
Big linker 3564 0.568 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.495 
Payout ratio 3564 0.414 0.000 0.396 0.726 0.361 
Liquid assets 3564 0.300 0.151 0.282 0.425 0.186 
Leverage 3564 0.423 0.267 0.431 0.583 0.207 
Investment 3564 0.380 0.044 0.879 1.000 0.790 
Growth 3564 0.297 0.035 0.466 1.000 0.763 
Return on Equity 3564 0.074 0.023 0.073 0.127 0.117 
Return on Assets 3564 0.072 0.031 0.062 0.101 0.073 
Market-to-book 2916 1.605 0.708 1.218 1.880 1.835 
Retained profits 3564 0.220 0.014 0.187 0.487 0.484 
Interest coverage 3564 7.402 3.933 10.000 10.000 3.608 
Firm size 3564 509.042 29.595 74.226 282.585 1812.272 
Tangibility 3564 0.332 0.125 0.286 0.493 0.256 
Net working capital 3564 0.215 0.046 0.203 0.367 0.214 
Quick ratio 3564 1.512 0.631 1.018 1.612 1.767 
Current ratio 3564 2.369 1.177 1.686 2.598 2.118 
Board size 3564 7.313 5.000 7.000 9.000 2.816 
Total interlocks 3564 8.290 2.000 5.000 12.000 8.639 
Total firm interlocks 3564 7.308 1.500 5.000 11.000 7.789 
Total bank interlocks 3564 0.984 0.000 1.000 2.000 1.289 
Conservatism 3564 0.312 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.463 
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mean mean mean mean mean
Big linker 0.553 0.546 0.613 0.607 0.475
Payout ratio 0.455 0.341 0.487 0.403 0.354
Liquid assets 0.200 0.237 0.333 0.364 0.377
Leverage 0.380 0.320 0.414 0.526 0.545
Investment 0.493 -0.108 0.605 0.501 0.503
Growth 0.475 -0.239 0.527 0.428 0.407
Return on Equity 0.057 0.040 0.096 0.069 0.117
Return on Assets 0.059 0.051 0.094 0.078 0.068
Market-to-book 1.074 1.174 1.880 1.231 2.683
Retained profits 0.032 0.040 0.254 0.540 0.278
Interest coverage 7.262 7.739 8.437 5.103 7.813
Firm size 104.604 106.369 155.794 737.166 2223.741
Tangibility 0.423 0.360 0.255 0.330 0.336
Net working capital 0.151 0.231 0.267 0.211 0.156
Quick ratio 1.889 2.003 1.439 1.014 0.967
Current ratio 2.786 3.158 2.309 1.678 1.449
Board size 7.218 6.792 7.008 8.143 7.942
Total interlocks 10.076 8.094 8.610 8.329 5.725
Total firm interlocks 8.968 7.193 7.754 7.052 4.869
Total bank interlocks 1.127 0.898 0.845 1.263 0.897
Conservatism 0.280 0.441 0.418 0.222 0.000
1908-1923 (N=568) 1928-1942 (N=876) 1948-1963 (N=1019) 1968-1983 (N=636) 1988-2003 (N=465)
Table 3B: Descriptive statistics per period (firm level) 
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Table 4: Which firms have big linkers in their boards? (Logit regression, marginal effects at the 
median) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables (lagged 5 years) 1913-1923 1928-1942 1948-1963 1968-1983 1988-2003 
            
Firm size 0.151*** 0.159*** 0.146*** 0.091*** 0.116*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Payout 0.010 0.003 0.030 0.057 -0.120 
  (0.892) (0.945) (0.540) (0.425) (0.337) 
Current ratio 0.007 -0.012 -0.005 0.019 -0.079 
  (0.513) (0.154) (0.666) (0.614) (0.332) 
Leverage 0.012 -0.084 -0.271** 0.055 0.074 
  (0.953) (0.441) (0.038) (0.781) (0.804) 
Tangibility -0.020 -0.196*** -0.140 -0.012 -0.113 
  (0.835) (0.006) (0.173) (0.936) (0.558) 
Growth -0.054 -0.037* -0.003 -0.020 -0.041 
  (0.259) (0.070) (0.925) (0.551) (0.407) 
Return on equity 0.907* -0.250 0.012 -0.643** 0.540*** 
  (0.056) (0.144) (0.956) (0.040) (0.001) 
Board size 0.122 0.214** 0.274*** 0.285*** -0.060 
  (0.338) (0.012) (0.003) (0.005) (0.612) 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 295 764 701 560 345 
Pseudo R-squared 23% 25% 26% 21% 23% 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
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Table 5: Example big linker fixed effect regression (dependent variable leverage) 
  
Control variables 
  Coefficient 
Variable (t-statistic) 
Firm size (ln)   
1908-1923 0.077*** 
  (5.809) 
1928-1942 0.045*** 
  (4.423) 
1948-1963 0.066*** 
  (7.569) 
1968-1983 0.041*** 
  (4.537) 
1988-2003 0.025*** 
  (3.059) 
Board characteristics 
  Coefficient 
Variable (t-statistic) 
Board size   
1908-1923 0.038 
  (0.936) 
1928-1942 -0.042 
  (-1.043) 
1948-1963 -0.055* 
  (-1.658) 
1968-1983 -0.069** 
  (-2.138) 
1988-2003 -0.059 
  (-1.279) 
Big linker fixed effects 
  Coefficient 
Variable (t-statistic) 
    
C.J.K. van Aalst 0.056 
  (1.149) 
K.P. van der Mandele 0.035 
  (0.996) 
C.J.P. van Westreenen 0.109*** 
  (2.825) 
S.P. van Eeghen -0.053 
  (-0.957) 
Other control variables YES 
Other board characteristics YES 
Year dummies YES 
Industry dummies YES 
Observations 3,564 
R-squared 0.441 
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Year Return on Equity Return on assets Payout Leverage Interest coverage Investment Growth Liquid assets
1908 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08
1913 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 -0.01
1918 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.12
1923 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.09
1928 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.11
1933 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.12
1938 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.10
1942 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.15
1948 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.15
1953 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.09
1958 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.10
1963 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.08
1968 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.06
1973 0.00 0.22 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.11
1978 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.07 0.05
1983 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.05 0.10 0.18
1988 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.12
1993 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.10 0.15
1998 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.08
2003 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02
YearWorking capital (net) Quick ratio Current ratio Tangibility Market to book Average (overall) Median (overall)
1908 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.05
1913 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.04
1918 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.10
1923 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.09
1928 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.10
1933 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.10
1938 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.08
1942 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.12
1948 0.10 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.09
1953 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
1958 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.11
1963 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.20 0.08 0.10
1968 0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.07 0.08
1973 0.10 0.03 -0.03 0.13 -0.02 0.08 0.13
1978 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.09 0.14
1983 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.24 -0.02 0.11 0.18
1988 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.09
1993 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.05
1998 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.03
2003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
Table 6: Explanatory power of director fixed effects for twelve policy metrics during the 
twentieth century 
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Chapter 4 
 
Dividend Smoothing, Financial Flexibility and Capital Structure46 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates the role of financial flexibility in corporate dividend smoothing practices. 
We argue that financial flexibility is a key determinant of cross-sectional variations in dividend 
smoothing policies. Contrary to, for example Fama and French (2001), we argue that dividends 
and the stability of cash dividends are still a very important part of financial decision making. 
Figure 6 shows that large and mature firms, with a history of dividend payments, pay on average 
2.3 times more divdends than the average firm in Compustat.47 Figure 7 shows the relative volatility 
of dividends and earnings as calculated by Leary and Michaely (2011), illustrating that the large 
and mature firms provide more stable dividends. Lambrecht and Myers (2012) predict that this 
dividend stability is only feasible if corporate capital structures can be easily adjusted. 
The main question answered in this paper is whether, financially flexible firms smooth their 
dividends more. Follwing Gamba and Triantis (2008) and De Jong et al. (2012), we define 
financial flexibility as the ability of a firm to fund investments and restructure its financing. Al- 
though studies such as those of Jagannathan (2000), Aivazian et al. (2006) and DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (2007) have hinted at a strong interaction between corporate capital structure and 
dividend policy, there is no clear evidence of a relationship with dividend smoothing policies.  
                                                          
46 This chapter has greatly benefited from comments by Abe de Jong, Peter Roosenboom, Chris Colvin, John Turner, Pooyan Ghazizadeh and 
members of the finance department of Queen’s Management School, Queen’s Belfast University. 
47These 517 firms constitute approximately 35 percent of all on-balance sheet assets and approximately forty-five percent of all 
dividends paid totalling over 1,6 trillion US dollars in the period 1987 till 2008 (on average 73 billion per annum). We exclude 
financials and utilities in all subsequent analyses. 
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Figure 6. Dividend to net income ratio 
 
Figure 7. Dividend/net income volatility 
 
Until now the literature has primarily focused on three areas of market frictions to explain 
the prevalent dividend stabilizing policies. First, information asymmetry between shareholders 
and managers induces dividend smoothing (Kumar, 1988; Kumar and Lee, 2001; Guttman et al., 
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2010). Second, dividend smoothing can also arise as a means to limit the agency costs of free 
cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984; Allen et al., 2000). Third, the existence of external 
financing costs is suggested as a driver of dividend smoothing (Miller and Scholes, 1978; Almeida et 
al., 2004; Aivazian et al., 2006). In this paper we introduce financial flexibility as a new 
explanation for cross-sectional differences in dividend smoothing. 
As in the case of Lambrecht and Myers (2012) and Leary and Michaely (2011), our analysis 
focuses on large and mature firms with publically traded debt. We use data of all the firms in both 
the CRSP and Compustat databases covering the period 1986-2008. We exclude financial firms 
and utilities.  Like Leary and Michaely (2011), we limit the sample to those firms that pay a dividend 
in at least 10 of the years in the period investigated. Additionally we reject firms that stop paying 
dividends more than three times in those ten years, to ensure that we identify firms with a reputable 
history of dividend payments. After applying all requirements, we have 517 unique firms from 
which we derive 5,159 firm-year observations. Dividend smoothing behaviour is calculated by 
estimating rolling window regressions, using Lintner’s (1956) model. We explain the variation in 
smoothing behaviour, using Feasible Least Squares models with correction for auto-correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. We use firm specific and time-varying metrics such as unused debt capacity 
(De Jong et al., 2012) and capital structure adjustment speeds (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) to 
measure a firm’s financial flexibility. Additionally we use a WW-index to capture differences in 
agency costs (Whited and Wu, 2006). We mitigate endogeneity concerns by correcting our 
estimates for the conditional probability that firms will self-select into groups of high leverage or high 
unused debt capacity. For this correction we use a novel instrument that captures shocks to the 
firms’ financial flexibility and which is unrelated their dividend policy; We use US Government 
Shutdowns, and show that firms that are large, mature and have a history of dividend payments 
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respond differently to such exogenous shocks, that is they outperform other firms by 127 basis 
points within five days of a shutdown. 
The contribution of this paper is then threefold. First, this paper provides evidence that 
financial flexibility is one of the key determinants of dividend smoothing, which is critical given the 
economic importance of large, mature firms with a history of paying dividends. Second, following 
Lambrecht and Myers (2012), this paper tests whether firms’ capital structure is indeed a shock 
absorber that enables dividend smoothing, which is important to broaden our understanding of 
how dividend policies and capital structure choices interact. Third, the exogenous shock used to 
correct our models for endogeneity has, to our knowledge, not yet been used in the literature. 
As predicted, we find that firms that are more financially flexible smooth their dividends 
more. First, we find that the relation between firms’ dividend policy and unused debt capacity 
is non-linear. At low levels of unused debt capacity we find that firms have limited incentive 
to smooth their dividends. At sufficiently high levels of unused debt capacity firms smooth their 
dividends significantly more. Second, we find that dividend smoothing increases by two percent 
for each standard deviation increase in the firms’ ability to quickly change its capital structure. With 
respect to Lambrecht and Myers (2012), we find that firms’ capital structure absorbs shocks to 
net income and enables dividend smoothing. Additionally, our results indicate that firms that 
have more unused debt capacity, or are able to adjust their capital structure more quickly, are better 
able to smooth their dividends in case of a shock to net income. Third, we show that firms smooth 
their dividends more when agency costs associated with underinvestment are higher. 
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following manner. Section II elaborates on 
the theoretical framework. Section III discusses the sample description and methodology. Section 
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IV provides the main results. Section V provides details on the robustness of our findings and 
section VI concludes. 
 
4.2 Theoretical framework and hypothesis development 
Lambrecht and Myers (2012) formulate a budget constraint where the net total payouts are 
determined by net income minus their capital expenditures, plus the change in debt. Net total 
payouts are defined as dividends plus share buybacks and minus equity issues. If this constraint is 
to hold in every period, payouts can only partly absorb the negative shocks to net income; the 
remainder must be absorbed by changes in borrowing, since investments are fixed due to contractual 
obligations and a finite set of investment opportunities. 
The change in debt must then (1) absorb most of the transitory noise in net income and 
(2) accommodate the delayed adjustment of payout changes in permanent income. The corrollary 
here is that financially more flexible firms, that is firms that can lend more, will be better at 
offsetting any disruptions and smooth dividends more. Following Gamba and Triantis (2008) and 
De Jong et al. (2012), we define financial flexibility as the ability of a firm to fund investments and 
restructure its financing. 
H. 1: Financially flexible firms smooth their dividends more. 
Heinkel and Zechner (1990) have shown that existing debt makes new investments less 
attractive, in particular when internal funds have been depleted.48 Firms that are financially more 
flexible have the incentive to separate themselves from competitors. Managers use dividends to 
                                                          
48 Though the issue of new debt or the use of existing debt (deployment of cash) reduces the over-investment problem, the 
cost of debt still increases with the issuance of new debt (Myers, 1977). 
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signal expectations of current and future earnings; dividends then also contain information on the 
firm’s opportunity set and financial flexibility.49 
Lie (2005) argues that firms with excess financial flexibility (i.e. sufficient debt capacity and 
high levels of permanent earnings) increase dividend payments. Firms that are financially 
constrained pay less in dividends and are less able to smooth their dividend payments (Almeida et 
al., 2004). Jagannathan (2000) shows that dividends are paid by firms with high permanent 
operating cash flows and that any changes in dividends have to do with non-transitory changes in 
income. Financial constraints thus determine how well firms are able to cope with transitory changes 
in income, when capital expenditures are fixed. 
As such, firms can be financially constrained due to limited profitability, high leverage or 
limited growth opportunities (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Whited and Wu, 2006). This form 
of constraint induces agency costs for the firm, since positive NPV projects are more likely to 
be forgone due to the manager’s risk aversion and habit formation, consistent with Lambrecht and 
Myers (2012). This type of underinvestment prompts firms to smooth their dividends. 
H. 2: Firms that face high agency costs smooth their dividends more. 
If the budget constraint from Lambrecht and Myers (2012) is to hold, then firms’ capital 
structure works as a shock absorber to net income, which allows managers to keep payouts stable. 
Lambrecht and Myers (2012) show that risk aversion and habit formation induce dividend 
smoothing, as managers seek to secure future rents. Managers thus have an incentive to smooth 
dividends as payouts and managerial rents move in lock-step (Lambrecht and Myers, 2014). 
                                                          
49 Information asymmetry can also be expressed in terms of principal agent models. For example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) 
and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) show that shareholders have to acquire information on the true profitability of the firms and that 
smoothing increases as the costs of acquiring this information increase (i.e. smoothing increases for more opaque firms). Moreover 
information asymmetry also occurs between investors, where firms with more individual investors will smooth more (e.g. Brennan 
and Thakor, 1990). 
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Consistent with Lintner (1956), who argues that managers realize the transitory nature of their 
earnings, shocks to net income are then persitently absorbed by firms’ capital structure. 
H. 3: Financially flexible firms with a shock to net income are better able to smooth 
dividends. 
 
4.3 Data and methodology 
 
Sample selection 
We use data for all firms in both the CRSP and Compustat databases over the period 1986- 2008. 
We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (4000-4999). For the analysis of 
corporate smoothing behaviour we require firms to have sufficient data to calculate smoothing 
metrics. Like Leary and Michaely (2011), we limit the sample to those firms that pay a dividend in 
at least ten of the years during our sample. Additionally, we reject firms that did not pay a dividend 
in at least three out of ten years. We do this to ensure that we select only firms with a history of 
reliable dividend payouts. We subsequently require firms to have information on the control 
variables used (discussed below). After applying all requirements, we have 517 firms from which 
we derive 5,159 firm-year observations (an average of approximately ten years of data per firm). 
 
Measuring dividend smoothing 
We use Linter’s (1956) model to calculate firm specific speed of adjustments (formula 3). By 
using rolling window regressions we are able to calculate speed of adjustments that change over 
time. The partial adjustment hypothesis, as introduced by Lintner (1956), holds that managers 
recognise the transitory nature of current earnings. Moreover Lintner shows that firms need a 
dividend discipline in which the changes in dividends are determined by prior dividend levels and 
current earnings. The firm’s desired level of dividends (ܦ݅ݒ௧כ) is given by: 
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ܦ݅ݒ௧כ ൌ ݎܧ௧ (1) 
where ܧ௧ are the firm’s current earnings and ݎ is the firm’s target payout ratio and can be 
expressed as a function of the firm’s investment and borrowing opportunities (Ang, 1975).50 
Additionally, Lintner (1956) argues that when earnings increase, a firm will not adjust its dividends 
completely if there is uncertainty about the firms’ ability to keep the dividends at the higher level. 
Moreover, the partial adjustment hypothesis shows that firms are reluctant to cut the amount of 
dividends, whereby the changes in dividends will be only gradual. In light of this, Lintner’s 
proposed partial adjustment process of the firm’s dividends is given by: 
οܦ݅ݒ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵܧ௧ ൅ ߚଶܦ݅ݒ௧ିଵ ൅ߝ௧Ǣ ׊݂݅ݎ݉ݏܽݐݐ݅݉݁ݐ (2) 
Where the target payout ratio (TPR) is then given by 
ఉభ
ఉమ
 and the speed with which firms adjust their 
dividends (SOA) is given by െߚଶ.51 Table I provides the definitions of the variables used in the 
subsequent analysis. 
 
Explaining cross-sectional variations in dividend smoothing 
To test our hypotheses we explain cross-sectional variations in dividend smoothing for large and 
mature firms with a history of dividend payments using proxies for the firms’ financial flexibility and 
agency costs. Our first variable of interest is the firms unused debt capacity, as estimated by De 
Jong et al. (2011). The firms’ unused debt capacity captures the firms relative ability to increase the 
amount of on-balance sheet debt, without losing its investment grade rating. The second variable 
                                                          
50 Moreover, Ang (1975) lists investors’ preferences, marginal tax rates and transaction costs as potential determinants of the target 
payout ratio. This is, however, beyond the scope of our argument. 
51 Note that SOAi,t is an inverse metric; put differently, firms with stable dividends have low adjustment speeds. Since SOAi,t is 
estimated for each firm separately we require each firm to have at least ten consecutive observations to allow for a robust rolling 
window estimation of the dividend adjustment speed at time t. The mid-points of these estimations are then matched with control 
variables and variables of interest at that point in time. 
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of interest is the firms’ capital structure adjustment speed, as estimated by Fama and French (2002) 
and Flannery and Rangan (2006). The firms’ capital structure adjustment includes the relative 
costs against which firms can quickly adjust their capital structure. Third we calculate the WW-
index, as estimated by Whited and Wu (2006), to capture agency costs induced by underinvestment. 
Fourth, we calculate the extent to which firms experience a shock to net income (scaled by total 
assets). We define a shock as change of the firms’ net income that is economically relevant to the 
firms’ dividend payment. Since the firms in our sample pay out approximately 2% of their asset 
value each period, we define a shock to net income of more than 2% to be economically relevant to 
the firms’ dividend policy. 
To explain corporate smoothing behaviour we then estimate the following base equation: 
ܱܵܣ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵܥ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܫ௜ǡ௧ ൅ߝ௜ǡ௧ (3) 
ܱܵܣ௜ǡ௧ is the speed of a firm’s dividend adjustment obtained from Equation 2. ܥ௜ǡ௧ is a 
vector of the firm specific control variables, which include leverage, m/b, firm size, profitability, 
tangibility, cash and earnings volatility. ܫ௜ǡ௧ are the variables of interest, including unused debt 
capacity and capital structure adjustment speed and the WW-index (appendix A and B on the 
specifications). We specify our models as Feasible Least Squares estimations, with an identity link 
function (ܺߚ ൌ ߤ). We correct for a heteroskedastic error structure with no cross-sectional 
correlation. Because our dependent variable is estimated using a rolling window regression, we 
employ a panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure (similar to Byoun (2008)), where the 
autocorrelation parameter is specified by the Durbin-Watson statistic (݀ ൌ ൫σ ሺఌ೟
೅
೟సమ ିఌ೟షభ൯
మ
σ ఌ೟మ೅೟సమ
).52  Since 
SOA is an estimated variable we weigh the dependent variable by the inverse of its estimation 
                                                          
52 This requires each firm in our sample to have at least two consecutive observations in our final sample. 
59A_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
117 
 
error, which allows us to put more weight on more accurately measured speed of adjustments. All 
models include time, industry and age decile fixed effect to ensure our findings are not driven by 
an omitted variable.53 
4.4 Endogeneity: US Government Shutdowns 
To alleviate concerns about the endogeneity of our estimations, we correct for two potential 
endogenous selection biases. The first bias arises from the firms’ ex ante choice in leverage. 
Consistent with Lambrecht and Myers (2012) and Lambrecht and Myers (2014) the firms leverage is 
persistent over time. As such, we estimate the conditional probability that a firm ex ante chooses to 
have high leverage (above industry year median) and include this in our models as the inverse Mills 
ratio of the appropriate binary response model. 
The second bias results from the firms ex ante choice in debt capacity. That is firm have 
an incentive based on their firm characteristics such as profitability, firm size or tangibility to 
preserve or impair their unused debt capacity. This self-selection bias is consistent with De Jong et al. 
(2012). They show that firms with high unused debt capacity invest more in future years and should 
thus smooth their dividends accordingly to maintain low-risk debt capacity. As such we correct 
our estimations for the conditional probability that firms ex ante choose to maintain high levels 
of unused debt capacity and include this in our model as the inverse mills ratio of the appropriate 
binary response model. 
As with Heckman (1979) our first-step binary response model requires an instrument 
unrelated to the firms’ dividend smoothing policy and related to the firms’ financial flexibility. In 
                                                          
53 We refrain from using firm fixed effects as the aim in this paper is not to examine within firm variation, but rather between-
firm variation. As the firms dividend smoothing SOAi,t is estimated per firm in our sample, firm fixed effects would absorb most 
of the between-firm variation. 
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this paper we use US Government Shutdowns as an instrumental variable. We define a government 
shutdown as point in time when US Congress chooses not to pass legislation funding government 
operations and agencies. Following this failure a funding gap is created, whereby programs and 
businesses that receive funding through operations are curtailed and possibly halted alltogether. 
We argue that large and mature firms, which are more likely to have government contracts (Forbes 
has estimated that only 22.5% of all contracts are awarded to small firms), are able to mitigate the 
shocks induced by the curtailment of government funding due to their financial flexibility. 
During our sample period we observe five of these shocks as shown in table II. We find, that 
over the different event windows the median cumulative abnormal returns were negative for firms 
listed in Compustat and CRSP. However the large and mature firms with a history of dividend 
payment substantially outperformed other firms by approximately 6 basis points upon 
announcement and 127 basis points in the five days following the shutdown. This finding is 
consistent with the idea that firms that financially more flexible firms are expected, to better cope 
with the consequences of a government shutdown. As such we define our instrumental variable as 
an indicator that equals 1 if at time t or at t−1 the US government experienced a shutdown and 
include it in the probit model (Equation 4), where the choice variable ( ௜ܻǡ௧) is either above year 
industry median leverage or unused debt capacity and standard controls are included. We 
subsequently derive the inverse mills ratio, capturing the conditional probability of the self-selection 
(see table III). 
൫ ௜ܻǡ௧ ൌ ͳห ܺ௜ǡ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߮ሺܺᇱ௜ǡ௧ߚଵሻ ൅ ߮ሺܫܸᇱ௜ǡ௧ߚଶሻ ൅ߝ௜ǡ௧ (4) 
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4.5 Results 
Univariate results 
Tables IV provide descriptive statistics for all variables of the firms in our sample. The median firm 
in our sample has a balance sheet size of almost 3 billion dollars, is overvalued, has a dividend yield 
of approximately 2.1%, can be considered liquid and has been included in CRSP for thirtyeight years. 
This illustrates how closely these firms resemble the firms described in Lambrecht and Myers (2012); 
large, mature firms with a reasonable number of growth options and free cash flow available for 
dividend payment. 
In unreported descriptive analysis we find, that firms that adjust their dividends quickly, 
are the larger, less profitable and more constrained firms. We find that firms with the largest unused 
debt capacity are the most overvalued firms. Consistently we find that the firms the most stable 
dividends also have higher market valuations. Additionally we show that firms with low levels of 
outstanding debt have significantly more cash holdings, consistent with the finding of Lambrecht 
and Pawlina (2013), where they state that debt and cash are in fact substitutes. Consistent with 
the aforementioned, we observe that firms that face more agency costs (i.e. high WW-index), 
smooth their dividends more, have less unused debt capacity, are more likely to operate above 
their target leverage and have a relatively high demand for external financing. The firms with the 
highest agency costs are less overvalued and have lower cash holdings, consistent with Almeida 
et al. (2004). 
 
Multivariate results 
Table V shows the multivariate explanation of dividend smoothing behaviour. Model 1 incor- 
porates only our control variables. We find that firms that have more leverage tend to smooth their 
dividends more. Consistent with diminished capital market access at high leverage levels, we find 
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that corporate debt ratios reflect cumulative requirements for external funds and dividend 
smoothing will increase as the firm’s debt ratio rises. We find that one standard deviation increase 
in the leverage prompts firms to smooth between 2-4% more. 
Firms that are more profitable will also smooth their dividends more, in order to signal 
stability, sufficient free cash flows and high permanent earnings, consistent with findings from Lie 
(2005). We find, that firms with more tangible assets and consequently lower levels of information 
asymmetry indeed smooth their dividends less. Additionally we find that more risky firms are more 
likely to smooth their dividends. Moreover we show that (inconsistent with the findings of Leary 
and Michaely (2011) that larger firms smooth their dividends less. We argue that in the presence 
of relatively small firms we might obtain the same findings as Leary and Michaely (2011), however 
here we focus only on the largest and most mature firms. 
When including the inverse mills ratio for the firms ex ante leverage choice we find that 
there is no significant selection bias. We then address the impact of the firm’s unused debt capacity 
on dividend smoothing behaviour. We find two things. First there is a significant endogenous 
selection with respect to the firms unused debt capacity. Consistent with Lambrecht and Myers 
(2014) we find that firms thus have an ex ante preference to preserve their debt capacity. Secondly 
we find that there is a non-linear relation between the firm’s debt capacity and its dividend 
smoothing. 
Initially firms with relatively low levels of unused debt capacity smooth their dividends 
less, since debt is a relatively poor shock absorber and firms choose to rapidly pay out their 
dividends (in case of positive shocks to net income) or cut dividends (in case of negative shocks 
to net income). However beyond a threshold (udc ≈ 0.45), firms smooth their dividends more as 
they aim to preserve their financial flexibility and easy access to capital markets to fund future 
61A_Erim Fliers BW_Stand V2.job
121 
 
investments (note that the firms with a high smoothing incentive have substantial growth 
opportunities and low current external financing demand).54 Put differently, firms that avoid 
smoothing at low unused debt capacity have an incentive to pay out their cash flows and signal 
future earnings and permanent earnings. Firms that have high unused debt capacity will smooth 
their dividends more in order to mitigate agency costs and keep access to low-cost external 
financing. As such, financially more flexible firms indeed smooth their dividends more, consistent 
with our hypothesis. 
We then find that firms that adjust their capital structure more quickly have an incentive 
to smooth their dividends. For these firms transitory shocks in income can easily be mitigated by 
changing the firms’ capital structure. Since debt is a better shock absorber and capital structure 
adjustment costs are low, firms aim to preserve their financial flexibility and limit external financing 
costs and thus have an incentive to signal. This effect has economic significance as a one standard 
deviation increase in capital structure adjustment speeds prompts a firm to smooth its dividends 
2.3% more. As such we are unable to reject our first hypothesis as we find that more financially 
flexible firms, both in terms of debt capacity and capital structure adjustment speed, smooth their 
dividends more. 
Subsequently we find that agency costs (as measured by the WW-index) are negatively 
associated with dividend smoothing. We find that one standard deviation increase in agency costs, 
is associated with approximately 4% more dividend smoothing, consistent with Lambrecht and Myers 
(2012) and our second hypothesis. 
Table VI shows the results for our third hypothesis. We find that in itself shocks to net 
income have no direct effect on dividend smoothing policies. However we find that as firms are 
                                                          
54 The infliction point of 0.45 is less than one standard deviation from the median, illustrating that including a squared term 
provides additional information. 
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more financially flexible they are able to smooth their dividends more in the presence of a shock. 
This finding holds for both of our proxies. As such we conclude that the firms’ capital structure 
indeed works as a shock absorber that enables dividend smoothing, in line with the predictions 
from Lambrecht and Myers (2012). An additional finding is that firms that face high agency costs 
also have an incentive to smooth their dividends more in the presence of an income shock, which 
is consistent with the signaling hypothesis. 
In this section we show that our results are not driven by variables from the main analysis. 
We include target payout choices, histories of high capital costs, interactions with WW-index, 
alternative measurement of agency costs, analyst forecasts, executive compensation and governance 
index. 
Table VII shows the inclusion of a dummy variable for high target payouts. We find 
that firms that promise above median payouts to shareholders smooth their dividends 
approximately 5% more. This finding is consistent with DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) and Leary 
and Michaely (2011) who show that firms that promise a high dividend smooth dividends to 
mitigate agency costs. Our primary results remain with the inclusion of the firms’ target payout 
ratio. 
Table VIII shows interaction effects with an indicator variable which equals 1 if a firm 
has a history of high capital costs, the firm has operated above its target leverage and had a m/b 
< 1 in previous periods (Warr et al., 2012). We find that firms with a history of high capital costs 
smooth their dividends more (approximately 3%) in order to reduce equity mispricing and maintain 
access to capital markets, consistent with (Warr et al., 2012). Additionally we find that firms 
with high levels of unused debt capacity smooth their dividends 53% more when they have a 
history of high capital costs. This finding illustrates that prior capital structure decisions have 
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severe impact on corporate dividend stability. In line with our previous findings and consistent with 
the assumption of risk averse managers we find that when firms have experienced high capital 
costs and agency costs increase (WW-index) managers decide to smooth their dividends more. 
Again our main results remain robust. 
Table IX shows that our results with respect to financial flexibility are not primarily driven 
by differences in agency costs between firms. Additionally we find that firms that face high 
agency costs dividend smoothing becomes more prevalent at high levels of unused debt capacity. 
This is consistent with the idea that firms aim to preserve access to capital markets and their 
debt capacity, since much of the agency costs are usually attributed to underinvestment problems. 
Our main results to not change. 
In Table X we analyse the sensitivity of our results with respect to our definition of shocks 
to net income. We find that our main results hold in these tests. Additionally we find that those firms 
that experience the most severe shocks (between 4% and 9%, either positive or negative), smooth 
their dividends approximately 16% more. In particular, when agency costs are higher, these firms 
smooth their dividends even more, in contrast to firms that at low levels of unused debt capacity 
are less able to smooth their dividends. 
Table XI shows additional inclusion of an alternative measure to agency costs, KZ-index 
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Additionally we include number of analyst forecasts made and the 
forecast deviations to account for potential differences in information asymmetry between firms. 
Further- more we include a governance index following Gompers et al. (2003) to ensure that our 
results are not driven by differences in governance between firms. We find that our main results 
hold. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the role of financial flexibility in corporate dividend smoothing practices. We 
define financial flexibility as the ability of a firm to fund investments and restructure its financing.  
Lintner (1956) argues that managers realize the transitory nature of their earnings. When combined 
with Lambrecht and Myers (2012) who model dividends as a function as the firms’ ability to change 
its capital structure, we are able to test three hypotheses. We do this for a subset of firms that is 
of high economic importance (on average firms in our sample represent 31% of all assets and 45% 
of all dividends paid). These firms are large, mature, and have a history of dividend payments. 
First we test whether firms that are more financially flexible smooth their dividends more. We 
find that firms with relatively high levels of unused debt capacity smooth there dividends more, and 
we find that firms that are able to adjust their capital structure also smooth their dividends more. 
Second we test whether firms that face more agency costs through underinvestment smooth their 
dividends more. We find that firms with a higher WW-index indeed smooth their dividends more. 
Third we test whether the firms’ capital structure works as a shock absorber to shocks in net 
income. We find that firms that have more unused debt capacity, or are able to adjust their capital 
structure more quickly, are better able to smooth their dividends in case of a shock to net income. 
We show that our results are robust to a battery of tests and the inclusion of additional 
variables. We conclude that dividend smoothing is highly dependent on firms’ financial 
flexibility and prior capital structure decisions. Additionally this paper highlights new avenues for 
research on dividend smoothing policies, and tests the implications from Lambrecht and Myers 
(2012). Given the economic importance of large and mature firms with a history of dividend 
payments, we argue that financial flexibility should be at the centre of both future empirical and 
theoretical advances in corporate finance.  
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Appendix A - Measurement of financial flexibility, agency costs and control 
variables 
 
We use two distinct measures of financial flexibility. First we calculate the firms unused debt 
capacity and second we calculate firm specific and time-varying capital structure adjustment 
speeds. Following De Jong et al. (2012), we calculate a firm’s debt capacity by predicting the debt 
level at which a specific firm in a given year has a p percentage chance of losing its investment-
grade rating, given the firm’s other characteristics. We model a firm’s credit rating ݕ௜ǡ௧כ  with an 
ordered response model, shown in Table B1: 
ݕ௜ǡ௧כ ൌ ߙଵ݀ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݔԢ௜ǡ௧ߙଶ ൅߳௜ǡ௧ (5) 
Where ݕ௜ǡ௧כ  is the latent variable, and ݔԢ௜ǡ௧is a set of firm characteristics based on Altman and Rijken 
(2004), and ݀ݎ௜ǡ௧ is the firms debt ratio.9 For the credit ratings we follow Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006), who measure corporate credit ratings based - on S&P credit ratings - on a 7-point scale 
(ranging from AAA to CCC&D).10 The ordered response model provides boundaries (γ) between 
different credit ratings. An investment-grade rating corresponds to the point where ݕ௜ǡ௧ ൒ Ͷ and 
ݕ௜ǡ௧כ ൒ ͵. We estimate the firm’s debt capacity by determining the expected value of ݕ௜ǡ௧כ   
conditional on the firm’s characteristics, current rating, debt ratio and by comparing this with 
threshold ɀଷ. We derive the measure for debt capacity by solving 
ߙଵ݀ܿ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݔԢ௜ǡ௧ߙଶ ൅ ܧ൛߳௜ǡ௧หݕ௜ǡ௧ǡ ݔ௜ǡ௧ǡ ݀ݎ௜ǡ௧ሽ ൌ  ɀଷ (5) 
The probability of having a speculative-grade rating, conditional upon the current rating, 
is then given by: 
 
ܲ൛ݕ௜ǡ௧כ ൏  ߛଷൟ ൌ ܲሼߙଵ݀ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݔᇱ௜ǡ௧ߙଶ ൅ ߣ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߳௜ǡ௧ ൏ ɀଷ (7) 
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Where ߣ௜ǡ௧ is the generalized residual for individual firms and is positive for firms with 
unexpected high credit ratings, these firms have unobservable firm characteristics that make their 
rating higher than expected. We assume that ߳௜ǡ௧ follows an F-distribution with ܨିଵሺǤ ሻ as its 
inverse. We define the debt capacity (݀ܿ) as the value for ݀ݎ௜ǡ௧ that results in a p probability of 
receiving a speculative rating. It is then the solution to: 
ܲ൛ߙଵ݀ܿ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݔᇱ௜ǡ௧ߙଶ ൅ ߣ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߳௜ǡ௧ ൏  ɀଷൟ ൌ ݌ǡ (8) 
Which yields 
݀ܿ௣ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ
ɀଷ െݔᇱ௜ǡ௧ߙଶ ൅ ߣ௜ǡ௧ െ ܨିଵሺ݌ሻ
ߙଵ
 
(9) 
To measure the firm’s financial flexibility we take the difference between the debt capacity 
and the debt ratio of the firm in year t. We assume that p = 0.2 - much like De Jong et al. (2012) - 
since it could be argued that the firm has reached its debt capacity when rating agencies are 
considering a down grade, rather than assuming a probability above 50%.55 
As a second proxy for the firms’ financial financial flexibility we use capital structure 
adjustment speeds, where high adjustment speeds represent low adjustment costs (i.e. low external 
financing costs). To measure target leverage we employ a standard partial adjustment model in 
which the change in book leverage partially absorbs the difference between target leverage ݀ݎ௧ାଵכ  
and lagged leverage ݀ݎ௧ (Fama and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Using year-by-
year cross-section regressions and Fama-McBeth time-sieries standard errors, we estimate: 
݀ݎ௜ǡ௧ାଵ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ߙଶݔԢ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ (10) 
 
                                                          
55 By construction the choice of p has no influence on the analysis 
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We then use the fitted value from Equation 11 as a proxy for ݀ ݎ௧ାଵכ  to calculate firm specific 
capital structure adjustment speeds we estimate for each firm separately: 
݀ݎ௜ǡ௧ െ ݀ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ߙଶሾ݀ݎ௜ǡ௧כ െ ݀ݎ௜ǡ௧ሿ ൅ߝ௜ǡ௧ (11) 
where ߙଶis the speed of adjustment for the firms’ capital structure. The specification further 
implies that: 
(1) The firm’s actual debt ratio eventually converges with its target debt ratio ݀ݎ௜ǡ௧כ .56 
 (2) All firms have a different adjustment speed (ߙଶ). 
(3) ߙଶis variable over time.57 
Other proxies for the firms’ financial flexibility are high capital costs, based on whether 
firms have a history of operating above their target leverage with limited growth opportunities, 
consistent with Warr et al. (2012), or financing deficits as a measure of the actual financial 
constraints that a firm faces, introduced in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
 
Measuring agency costs 
Following the literature on financial constraints we calculate a WW-index (Whited and 
Wu, 2006) (in the robustness analysis we also include a KZ-index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997)).14 
We argue that measures such as the KZ- and WW-index capture the financial constraints induced 
by agency costs that increase as the probability of the occurrence of underinvestment increases. 
                                                          
56 see Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
57 Flannery and Rangan (2006) highlight that they find evidence that firm characteristics affect capital structure adjustment 
speeds; however these results are left unreported because the firm specific adjustment speeds are very similar to their published 
estimate. However, here it is possible that cross-sectional differences between firms affect corporate adjustment speeds, in that 
different firms face different levels of adjustment costs. Since it is our goal to explain dividend smoothing practices using capital 
structure adjustment speeds, we cannot assume that all firms have similar adjustment speeds. 
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Control variables 
Our analysis includes other proxies for other market frictions, where we distinguish 
between market frictions arising from asymmetric information and frictions associated with 
agency costs. Table 1 shows all variables and their definitions. To take into account the corporate 
characteristics associated with asymmetric information, we use firm size to capture the firm’s 
maturity, because larger firms are usually well known and face lower information asymmetry 
(Frank and Goyal, 2003; Lemmon and Zender, 2010). To proxy for the firm’s assets we use two 
metrics. We use asset tangibility to proxy for the investor’s ease in valuing the firm’s assets (Harris 
and Raviv, 1991). We use the market-to-book ratio to take into account the investor’s perception 
of the firm’s future growth opportunities. Moreover we use leverage as a proxy for the firm’s 
financial risk and the historically accumulated external capital.  To take into account the corporate 
characteristics associated with agency costs, we use profitability and market-to-book ratios to 
discover which firms are able to make relative profitable investments (Jensen, 1986; Fama and 
French, 2002). We incorporate corporate cash holdings to capture the substitution effect implied 
by the pecking order theory and the financial slack hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). Finaly we include 
earnings volatility to capture equity risk factors that increase dividend smoothing (Kumar, 1988; 
Kumar and Lee, 2001). 
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Appendix B - Calculation financial constraints 
 
We calculate the relevant indices based on their respective sources, in the following manner: 
ܭܼ ൌെͳǤͲͲʹ כ
ܥܨ
ܭ
൅ ͲǤʹͺ͵ כ
ܯ
ܤ
൅ ͵Ǥͳ͵ͻ כ
ܦܾ݁ݐ
ܭ
െ ͵ͻǤ͵͸ͺ כ
ܦ݅ݒ
ܭ
െ ͳǤ͵ͳͷ כ
ܥܽݏ݄
ܭ
 
(12) 
ܹܹ ൌെͲǤ͸ʹ͸ כ
ܥܨ
ܣ
൅ ͲǤʹͺ͵ כ ܦௗ௜௩ ൅ ͲǤͳ͵ͻ כ
ܦܾ݁ݐ
ܣ
െ ͵ͻǤ͵͸ͺ כ ܣ ൅ ͲǤͲͶͻ
כ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ൅ ͲǤͲͳͶ כ ܵ 
(13) 
ܵܣ ൌ
ܵ݅ݖ݁݈݀݁ܿ݅݁ ൅ ܣ݃݁݈݀݁ܿ݅݁
ʹ
 
(14) 
ܨ݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅݊݃݂݀݁݅ܿ݅ݐ ൌ
ܦܫܸ ൅ ܺ ൅οܹ ൅ ܴ െ ܥ
ܶܣ
 
(15) 
 
Where ܦܫܸ is the amount of dividends paid in period t, X is the capital expenditures, ߂ܹis the net 
increase in working capital, ܴ is the current portion of long-term debt at the start of the period and 
C is the cash flow from operations. ܥܨ is cash flow, ܥܽݏ݄ is cash holdings. ܦௗ௜௩௜ௗ௘௡ௗ is a dummy 
that equals 1 if a firm paid dividend, ܣ is total assets, ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ is a factor capturing industry 
sales growth, ܵ  captures firm specific sales growth. 
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Mean Median
Total assets 8,545 2,306
Sales 6,701 1,757
Book leverage 0.379 0.337
EBIT ratio 0.072 0.082
Age 25.086 22.000
Retained earnings 0.065 0.125
Working capital 0.103 0.078
Credit rating 3.678 4.000
Coefficient Standard Errors
Sales ratio 0.532*** (0.173)
Leverage -6.511*** (0.922)
EBIT ratio 2.428*** (0.559)
Retained earnings 0.603*** (0.199)
workingcapital_orth -3.492*** (1.165)
Year FE YES
Age FE YES
N 36,208
Pseudo R² 0.203
Boundaries
γ₁ 0.668
γ₂ 4.048
γ₃ 5.647
γ₄ 7.361
γ₅ 9.327
γ₆ 11.408
Credit Rating
Panel B: Credit rating
All Firm-Years (N = 36,265)
Panel A: Firm characteristics
Table B1: Ordered logit estimation 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Variable description 
Variables name Definitions 
Speed of adjustment Formula (3) 
Relative volatility Formula (6) 
Unused debt capacity Formula (11) 
Capital structure adjustment speed Formula (13) 
Leverage Debt to total asset 
Total debt Total assets minus book value of equity to total assets
Target debt Formula (12) 
Deviation from target debt Difference between target debt and total debt
Above target debt (dummy) Equal to one if total debt larger than target debt zero otherwise
KZ-index Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
WW-index Whited and Wu (2006)
SA-index Hadlock and Pierce (2010)
External financing demand Rajan and Zingales (1998)
Financing deficit Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
Financing deficit surplus (dummy) Equal to one if financing deficits are present and zero otherwise
Sales ratio Total sales 
EBIT ratio Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets
Profitability Net income to total assets
Reported losses Equal to one if losses are reported and zero otherwise
Retained earnings Retained earnings 
Working capital Working capital to total assets
Dividend yield Dividend per share divided by year-end stock price
Firm size (milions, adjusted for inflation base year 2013) Total assets adjusted for inflation (base year 2013)
Market-to-book Leary and Michaely (2011)
Tangibility Fixed assets to total assets
Cash Cash and cash equivalents to total assets
Liquidity Current assets to total assets
Non-debt tax shield Depreciation and amortization to total assets
Growth Yearly change in total assets
Forecast deviation Deviation of earnings from median analyst forecast
Number of analysts Number of analysts 
Board size Board size 
Total compensation Total compensation 
Total current compensation Total current compensation
Total bonusses awared Total bonusses awared
Dollar value of options awarded Dollar value of options awarded
Bonus to total compensation Bonus to total compensation
Value of options awarded to total compensation Value of options awarded to total compensation
Total compensation to net income Total compensation to net income
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Variables (7) (8) (9) (10)
Unused debt capacity x Income shock 0.103*** 0.083***
(0.000) (0.001)
sed debt capacity (squared) x Income shock -0.089*** -0.076**
(0.005) (0.015)
structure adjustment speed x Income shock -0.032*** -0.018**
(0.000) (0.035)
WW-index x Income shock -0.055** -0.048*
(0.038) (0.083)
Income shock -0.009** 0.020*** 0.007*** 0.004
(0.033) (0.000) (0.003) (0.541)
Unused debt capacity 0.160*** 0.155***
(0.000) (0.000)
Unused debt capacity (squared) -0.192*** -0.181***
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital structure adjustment speed -0.015** -0.015**
(0.047) (0.044)
Size-age index -0.132*** -0.122***
(0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.059** -0.099*** -0.116*** -0.058**
(0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035)
M/B -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005
(0.563) (0.780) (0.473) (0.105)
Size (ln) 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.035***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability 0.023 0.056* 0.041 -0.017
(0.427) (0.074) (0.147) (0.599)
Tangibility 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.122*** 0.105***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash 0.061 0.114*** 0.131*** 0.091**
(0.120) (0.004) (0.001) (0.020)
Earnings volatility (ln) -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.013**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.014)
Inverse mills ratio (Unused debt capacity) -0.348*** -0.463*** -0.467*** -0.317***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inverse mills ratio (Leverage) 0.062* 0.040 0.005 0.010
(0.056) (0.220) (0.880) (0.762)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Inverse mills ratio's YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Age deciles YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,155 5,155 5,155 5,155
Number of id 517 517 517 517
Chi-square 4220 4170 4957 4364
Table 6: Explaining dividend smoothing and firms experiencing an income shock. 
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Variables (11) (12) (13) (14)
High target payouts -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.048***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unused debt capacity 0.186*** 0.192***
(0.000) (0.000)
Unused debt capacity (squared) -0.221*** -0.221***
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital structure adjustment speed -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.000) (0.000)
WW-index -0.137*** -0.144***
(0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.050* -0.103*** -0.112*** -0.057**
(0.081) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032)
M/B -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003
(0.962) (0.957) (0.676) (0.251)
Size (ln) 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability 0.007 0.064** 0.026 -0.015
(0.836) (0.012) (0.315) (0.510)
Tangibility 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.108***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash 0.127*** 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.126***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Earnings volatility (ln) -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Inverse mills ratio (Unused debt capacity) -0.316*** -0.425*** -0.410*** -0.260***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Inverse mills ratio (Leverage) 0.023 -0.003 -0.028 -0.028
(0.493) (0.929) (0.386) (0.373)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Inverse mills ratio's YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Age deciles YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,159 5,159 5,159 5,159
Number of id 517 517 517 517
Chi-square 4481 4394 5435 5056
Table 7: Explaining dividend smoothing and having high target dividends.  
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Variables (15) (16) (17) (18)
Unused debt capacity x High capital costs 0.486*** 0.335***
(0.000) (0.000)
Unused debt capacity (squared) x High capital costs -0.569*** -0.381**
(0.000) (0.018)
Capital structure adjustment speed x High capital costs -0.055*** -0.015
(0.000) (0.329)
WW-index x High capital costs -0.259*** -0.149***
(0.000) (0.005)
High capital costs -0.069*** 0.001 -0.008 -0.032**
(0.000) (0.964) (0.398) (0.028)
Unused debt capacity 0.135*** 0.120***
(0.000) (0.000)
Unused debt capacity (squared) -0.170*** -0.166***
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital structure adjustment speed -0.013** -0.014**
(0.020) (0.021)
WW-index -0.090*** -0.096***
(0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.035 -0.095*** -0.103*** -0.057**
(0.222) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040)
M/B -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005*
(0.436) (0.398) (0.129) (0.079)
Size (ln) 0.038*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.033***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.005 0.044 0.023 -0.006
(0.884) (0.154) (0.280) (0.837)
Tangibility 0.120*** 0.115*** 0.133*** 0.112***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash 0.065* 0.108*** 0.135*** 0.109***
(0.087) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004)
Earnings volatility (ln) -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.011**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037)
Inverse mills ratio (Unused debt capacity) -0.296*** -0.388*** -0.333*** -0.261***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Inverse mills ratio (Leverage) 0.038 0.021 -0.011 -0.008
(0.233) (0.524) (0.737) (0.805)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Inverse mills ratio's YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Age deciles YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,159 5,159 5,159 5,159
Number of id 517 517 517 517
Chi-square 4332 4518 5284 4482
Table 8: Explaining dividend smoothing and firms with a history of high capital costs 
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Variables (19) (20) (21)
Unused debt capacity x WW 0.125*** 0.111***
(0.000) (0.000)
Unused debt capacity (squared) x WW -0.135*** -0.124***
(0.001) (0.001)
Capital structure adjustment speed x WW -0.012 -0.011
(0.233) (0.262)
WW -0.027*** -0.006 -0.021***
(0.000) (0.300) (0.005)
Unused debt capacity 0.142*** 0.141***
(0.000) (0.000)
Unused debt capacity (squared) -0.153*** -0.151***
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital structure adjustment speed -0.025*** -0.019**
(0.002) (0.016)
Leverage -0.048* -0.107*** -0.048*
(0.093) (0.000) (0.093)
M/B -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.644) (0.787) (0.463)
Size (ln) 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.036***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.008 0.044 -0.012
(0.823) (0.154) (0.710)
Tangibility 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.110***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash 0.083** 0.119*** 0.104***
(0.031) (0.003) (0.007)
Earnings volatility (ln) -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Inverse mills ratio (Unused debt capacity) -0.340*** -0.417*** -0.325***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inverse mills ratio (Leverage) 0.035 0.024 0.025
(0.281) (0.461) (0.436)
Controls YES YES YES
Inverse mills ratio's YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Age deciles YES YES YES
Observations 5,159 5,159 5,159
Number of id 517 517 517
Chi-square 4427 4624 4167
Table 9: Explaining dividend smoothing and agency costs. 
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` KZ-index Information Governance Index
KZ-index -0.001***
(0.003)
Number of analyst forecasts -0.015
(0.119)
Forecast deviation 0.001
(0.520)
Governance Index -0.011***
(0.000)
Unused debt capacity 0.189*** 0.107*** 0.145***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Unused debt capacity (squared) -0.222*** -0.167*** -0.180***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital structure adjustment speed -0.024*** -0.020*** -0.029***
(0.000) (0.006) (0.002)
WW-index -0.129*** -0.079***
(0.000) (0.004)
Leverage -0.043 -0.070** -0.085**
(0.125) (0.014) (0.013)
M/B -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.696) (0.659) (0.835)
Size (ln) 0.039*** 0.047*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.883)
Profitability -0.015 0.022 0.000
(0.655) (0.510) (0.997)
Tangibility 0.129*** 0.167*** 0.051**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.033)
Cash 0.084** 0.006 0.096*
(0.033) (0.878) (0.066)
Earnings volatility (ln) -0.017*** -0.016*** 0.006
(0.002) (0.007) (0.413)
Inverse mills ratio (Unused debt capacity) -0.288*** -0.355*** -0.066
(0.001) (0.000) (0.553)
Inverse mills ratio (Leverage) 0.051 0.063* -0.141***
(0.114) (0.060) (0.002)
Controls YES YES YES
Inverse mills ratio's YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Age deciles YES YES YES
Observations 5,159 4,031 3,365
Number of id 517 426 262
Chi-square 4281 3395 29988
Table 11: Explaining dividend smoothing and additional tests 
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Chapter 5 
 
Summary and limitations 
 
Each essays on corporate finance presented in this dissertation provide independent 
conclusions. In this chapter I will provide a summary. I will then discuss the limitations of the 
different chapters in this dissertation. Additionally I share my views on the relevance of 
economic history and on the relationship between research in financial history and 
contemporary finance. 
 
5.1 Summary 
In the first essay answers the question why some banks fail in financial crises while others 
survive. This article answers this question by analysing the effect of the Dutch financial crisis 
of the 1920s on 142 banks, of which 33 failed. We show that balance sheet composition and 
product market strategy choices made in the lead-up to the crisis had a significant impact on 
banks subsequent chances of experiencing distress. We document that high-risk banks those 
making large profits, operating highly-leveraged portfolios and attracting large quantities of 
deposits were more likely to fail. Branching and international activities also increased banks 
default probabilities. We measure the effects of board interlocks, which have been 
characterized in the extant literature as contributing to the Dutch crisis. We find that boards 
matter: failing banks had smaller boards, shared directors with smaller and very profitable 
banks and had a lower concentration of interlocking directorates in non-financial firms. 
The second essay investigates the effects of individual directors on corporate policies 
and firm performance. For directors with many executive and supervisory commitments in the 
board of multiple firms, so-called big linkers, we estimate whether the presence of these 
individuals is systematically related with corporate policies and performance. Over the course 
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of the 20th century for Dutch exchange-listed firms we argue big linkers matter and explain a 
substantial part of the variation in firm corporate policies and performance. By analysing 
director fixed effects we estimate that the contribution in explaining corporate policy 
throughout the 20th century is between 4-11%. Using archival sources and biographical details 
we provide an overview of the big linkers that were found to have a significant effect on 
corporate policies over the twentieth century. 
The final essay investigates the impact of corporate financial flexibility on dividend 
smoothing practices. We define financial flexibility as the firm’s ability to fund investments 
and to restructure its financing. We measure the firms’ financial flexibility using firm specific 
and time-varying measures of unused debt capacity and capital structure adjustment speeds. 
Our findings are threefold. First, we find that firms smooth their dividends more when they are 
more financially flexible. Second, we find that firms smooth their dividends more when agency 
costs are high. Third, we show that firms’ capital structure absorbs shocks to net income and 
enables dividend smoothing. 
 
5.2 Limitations and suggestions 
This section provides an overview of the limitations and suggestions for further research based 
on chapters two, three and four. For chapter two we acknowledge that our data is incomplete. 
The set of banks investigated in this chapter is by no-means a complete set of all banks in the 
Netherlands during the 1920s. Although we argue that the data covers 83% of the nominal 
equity at the time, there were many much smaller banks operating in the Netherlands at the 
time, hence it could be that generalizing behaviour to all banks in the Netherlands is 
unwarranted. 
Chapter two is a first step into an investigation into the long-run evolution of the Dutch 
financial services sector over the twentieth century. Additionally future research will focus on 
the survival chances of non-financial firms during the 1920s, where we explore how managers 
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who were active during both the 1920s and 1930s fared in navigating through crisis periods, 
systematically describe distress events and methods of distress resolution. 
In the third chapter I investigate the cohesion between individual Dutch managers and 
the outcome of corporate policies such as dividends, investments and capital structures. By 
looking at the 266 board members with the most board seats during the twentieth century we 
attempt to understand to understand the influence these managers actually have. However in 
this paper I am unable to disentangle influence from selection. That is, in our analysis it is 
empirically difficult to see whether the impact we estimate for an individual big linker is actual 
influence or systematic corporate policy for which the big linker is selected. We mitigate this 
concern by providing biographic descriptions of big linkers that we are had influence or were 
selected for specific reasons. In future versions of this chapter we will also mitigate this 
problem with additional analysis. 
Another limitation of this study is the extent of the data. Both the data of financial 
statements and governance information has been collected every five years over the period 
1903 till 2003. This might result in an underestimation of the number of board members that 
we identify to be big linkers. We mitigate this problem by using a conservative definition of 
what constitutes a big linker and future versions of the chapter will test for robustness using 
different definitions. 
This chapter is a first description the evolution of the impact of governance and board 
members on corporate policies. Subsequent projects will investigate the evolution of Dutch 
corporate networks from a more quantitative perspective and will study historical episodes in 
Dutch history and investigate the impact of these events on changes in corporate governance 
and corporate networks. 
In the fourth chapter I investigate the impact of financial flexibility on dividend 
smoothing policies. First, this chapter excludes share repurchases from the analysis. Grullon 
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and Michaely (2002) argue that share repurchases work as a substitute for actual dividends. 
Future versions of this chapter will take this into account. Other limitations of this study are: 
(1) an endogenous selection bias, I mitigate this problem by correcting the estimations with the 
firm-year specific probability that a firm chooses to limit its ex-ante financial flexibility; (2) an 
omitted variable bias, I mitigate this problem by including industry, time and age decile fixed 
effect. 
This chapter is the first part of a research agenda that places financial flexibility at the 
center of corporate decision making. Subsequent research will focus on the relation between 
financial flexibility and earnings management, executive compensation and security issuances. 
 
5.3 The relation between economic history and contemporary finance 
This dissertation provides answers on prime questions in economic history, corporate 
governance and corporate finance. The relationship between these subject areas is sometimes 
overlooked. Here I would like to make a case for research in any area to be inspired by 
historically sensitive ideas. The argument here is that any type of research in finance (or 
financial economics) can benefit from history in three distinct ways. 
First, history can provide us with relevant cases that puts contemporary events into 
perspective and can provide policy implications. In chapter 2 I studied the largest financial 
crisis the Netherlands had seen up until 2007. During the 1920s, the Netherlands lacked a 
modern central bank and Dutch banks were unfamiliar with state-sponsored rescues. Although 
the Dutch government occasionally intervened in during the crisis, banks and financial markets 
did not ex-ante expect bailouts to occur. And when it did intervene, the Dutch government and 
the Dutch central bank did so mostly in secret, using odd strategies like guaranteeing stock 
prices. We show that the Dutch government understood the too big to fail doctrine, as it rescued 
one of the country’s largest bank. However, because the banking industry had never before 
experienced a crisis of this magnitude, the intervention was unforeseen. And there were far 
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fewer banks that were big enough to warrant such a rescue effort. Overall, intervention proved 
to be irregular and was perceived by bankers and the public as improbable. The industry had 
no official lender of last resort to turn to, forcing banks to resolve their distress on their own 
initiative. In spite of the Dutch institutional setting, banks still failed in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. However, failing banks did so at low costs to the taxpayer, especially when 
compared to the costs incurred following the financial crisis of 2007 (Colvin et al., 2014). 
Second, historical inquiries can provide us with insights into the evolution of corporate 
practices and decision making of managers, allowing for alternative ideas in current debates. 
In chapter 3 I demonstrate the evolution of the importance of board members. Recently there 
has been a debate on the height and frequency of bonuses paid to managers. Following the 
evolution these see that the board members in our sample have systematic influence on 
corporate policy. These board members managed relatively large firms that are highly 
profitable and their added value is especially needed when the economy is recovering after a 
crisis. The influence of prominent business men is very much determined by their network, 
their centrality and their societal status. Put differently, these business men have certain 
qualities that make them exceptional. 
Third, history can inspire. History can provide interesting examples that can help to 
resolve contemporary puzzles in corporate finance. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of 
financial flexibility for the dividend smoothing decision managers. This idea stemmed from 
the fact that for firms the prime directive is to survive. Firms survive by limiting risks in the 
balance sheet composition and product market strategy (see chapter two). From chapter three 
we learned that board members actively contributed to corporate policies, consistent the theory 
of Lambrecht and Myers (2012) as outlined in chapter four. They argue that managers are risk 
averse and suffer from habit formation and in order to secure their future rents, subsequently 
these managers choose to smooth the dividends paid. Combined with other project not included 
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in this dissertation, on the long-term evolution of dividend policies in the Netherlands (De Jong, 
2014), these aforementioned chapters very much inspired the topic of chapter four. The main 
takeaway here is that studying economic history can help us to put current events into 
perspective. Economic history as a discipline is on the rise, its added value both in terms of 
research and teaching can be tremendous. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting, beperkingen en visie  
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
De drie studies, opgenomen in dit proefschrift, bieden ieder onafhankelijke conclusies. In dit 
hoofdstuk geef ik een samenvatting. Daarna bespreek ik de beperkingen van de verschillende 
hoofdstukken en geef ik mijn visie op de relevantie van economische geschiedenis en haar 
relatie met hedendaags onderzoek in het vakgebied van bedrijfsfinanciering. 
 
Samenvatting 
In het tweede hoofdstuk bekijken we waarom sommige banken failliet gaan, terwijl andere een 
crisis overleven. We beantwoorden deze vraag door te kijken naar de effecten van de financiële 
crisis ten tijden van de jaren twintig van de vorige eeuw in Nederland. Van 142 banken, 
waarvan er toentertijd 33 in de problemen kwamen. We laten zien dat de balanssamenstelling 
en de product-marktstrategie keuzes, voorafgaand aan de crisis, cruciaal waren in het 
voorspellen van de overlevingskansen van deze banken. We documenteren dat hoog-risico 
banken, zij die grote winsten maakten, een grote schuldenpositie hadden en veel deposito’s 
aantrokken, meer kans hadden om failliet te gaan. Daarnaast zien we ook dat banken met veel 
filialen en internationale activiteiten meer kans hadden om ten onder te gaan. Ook meten we 
de mate van verbondenheid tussen verschillende banken en of deze verbondenheid extra 
faillissementen risico met zich mee brengt. We vinden dat de kenmerken van de overlappingen 
van directeuren en commissarissen, tussen de verschillende banken, tezamen met 
beleidsstructuren erg belangrijk waren: banken die ten onder gingen hadden kleinere directies, 
deelden veel directeuren met kleine winstgevende banken en hadden een lagere concentratie 
overlappen met niet-financiële ondernemingen.  
In hoofdstuk drie onderzoeken we de invloed die individuele directeuren hebben op 
ondernemingsbeleid en de daaruit volgende prestaties. In het bijzonder kijken we naar 
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directeuren die veel uitvoerende en controlerende taken hadden bij verschillende 
ondernemingen, zogenoemde big-linkers. We analyseren of de aanwezigheid van deze 
individuen systematisch te koppelen is aan het bedrijfsbeleid en de winstgevendheid van de 
onderneming. We laten zien dat over de gehele twintigste eeuw deze big-linkers ongeveer 4 tot 
11% van de variatie in bedrijfsbeleid en prestatie verklaren. Met behulp van archieven en 
biografische beschrijvingen geven we een overzicht van welke big-linkers nu werkelijk 
belangrijk waren in de twintigste eeuw. 
In hoofdstuk vier analyseren we de invloed van financiële flexibiliteit op de dividend 
stabilisatie politiek van de onderneming. We definiëren financiële flexibiliteit als het vermogen 
van de onderneming om haar investeringen te financieren en haar kapitaal structuur te herzien. 
We vinden dat de ondernemingen met de grootste flexibiliteit in staat zijn om stabielere 
dividenden te genereren. Dit kan op drie manieren gebeuren. Ondernemingen die financieel 
flexibeler zijn, stabiliseren hun dividenden om op deze manier toekomstige projecten beter te 
kunnen financieren. Ook kunnen ondernemingen er voor kiezen om hun dividenden te 
stabiliseren om zo in de toekomst lagere financieringskosten te hebben. Als laatste reden voor 
dividend stabilisatie laten wij zien dat ondernemingen de kosten van interactie met 
aandeelhouders (klassiek principaal-agent probleem) willen beperken. We concluderen dat 
dividend stabilisatie politiek grotendeels afhankelijk is van de financiële flexibiliteit van de 
onderneming en de kapitaal structuur keuzes die gemaakt zijn in het verleden. 
 
Beperkingen 
Zoals iedere studie kent ook dit proefschrift in de verschillende hoofdstukken een aantal 
beperkingen, hieronder volgen de belangrijkste. Hoewel hoofdstuk twee al is gepubliceerd, zijn 
er twee belangrijke beperkingen die we kunnen aanwijzen. Als eerste het feit dat onze data 
beperkt zijn. De banken die wij bekijken in dit hoofdstuk zijn niet alle banken die operationeel 
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waren ten tijde van de financiële crisis in de jaren twintig. Hoewel wij beargumenteren dat de 
banken waar wij gegevens van hebben ongeveer 83% van de nominale waarde van het 
eigenvermogen van de volledige bankensector in Nederland beslaat, waren er zeer veel hele 
kleine banken actief in deze periode. Het is dan ook goed mogelijk dat het trekken van 
algemene conclusies voor de gehele Nederlandse bankensector problematisch is. 
In het derde hoofdstuk onderzoek ik de samenhang tussen beleid van ondernemingen 
en de rol die managers spelen bij het vaststellen van dividenden, investeringen en 
schuldfinanciering. Ik kijk naar 266 directeuren en commissarissen die de meeste posities 
hadden tijdens de twintigste eeuw. Zo beschrijf ik welke bijdrage bestuurders leveren aan 
bijvoorbeeld de prestaties van de onderneming. Het is echter niet mogelijk om daadwerkelijke 
invloed of macht te scheiden van een selectie bias. Anders gezegd, een beperking van deze 
studie is dan ook dat we niet kunnen zien of een bestuurder invloed uitoefent of dat hij door de 
onderneming is geselecteerd om een specifieke taak uit te voeren. We verminderen dit 
probleem door individuele bestuurders te beschrijven aan de hand van biografieën en 
archiefmateriaal. 
Een andere beperking van deze studie is de data. Zowel de financiële data als de data 
met betrekking tot ondernemingsbestuur is verzameld voor iedere vijf jaar in de periode 1903-
2003. Deze keuze kan ertoe leiden dat we het aantal big-linkers onderschatten. We verminderen 
dit probleem door een conservatieve definitie van een big-linker te hanteren en toekomstige 
versies van dit hoofdstuk zullen robustheidstesten bevatten met verschillende definities. 
Het vierde hoofdstuk, zoals hier beschreven, bevat een aantal belangrijke beperkingen. 
Ten eerste bespreek ik het gebruik van aandelen inkopen door ondernemingen niet. Grullon en 
Michaely (2002) hebben laten zien dat het inkopen van aandelen door ondernemingen fungeert 
als een substituut voor contante dividend uitkeringen. Toekomstige versies van dit hoofdstuk 
zullen hier wel rekening mee houden. Daarnaast zijn er nog twee andere beperkingen; (1) een 
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endogeen selectie effect, ik beperk dit probleem door de schattingen te corrigeren met 
ondernemingsjaar specifieke variabelen die de kans meten dat een onderneming ex-ante er voor 
kiest zijn financiële flexibiliteit te beperken; (2) een weggelaten variabele, ik beperk dit 
probleem door industrie-, tijd- en leeftijdgroepeffecten mee te nemen in de analyses. Dit 
hoofdstuk is een eerste onderdeel van een onderzoeksagenda waarin de financiële flexibiliteit 
van de onderneming centraal wordt geplaatst in het besluitvormingsproces. Toekomstig 
onderzoek zal zich richten op de relatie tussen financiële flexibiliteit en winststuring, 
beloningen voor bestuurders en de uitgifte van kapitaal. 
 
Onderzoek in economische geschiedenis en moderne financieringsleer 
Dit proefschrift beantwoordt een aantal kernvragen binnen de vakgebieden economische 
geschiedenis, bedrijfsfinanciering en kenmerken van goed bestuur. De relatie tussen deze 
onderwerpen wordt soms door onderzoekers over het hoofd gezien. Ik zou dan ook van de 
gelegenheid gebruik willen maken om uiteen te zetten waarom economisch of bedrijfskundig 
onderzoek baat kan hebben bij historisch gevoelige concepten. Ik besprek drie manieren 
waarop dit mogelijk is. 
Als eerste zou ik willen noemen dat economische gebeurtenissen uit het verleden ons 
een nieuw perspectief kunnen geven op hedendaagse ontwikkelingen en nieuwe richtingen 
kunnen bieden voor beleidsvoering. In hoofdstuk twee bestuderen we de grootste financiële 
crisis die Nederland voor 2007 heeft getroffen. Tijdens de jaren twintig had Nederland geen 
moderne centrale bank met een mandaat om de financiële sector te reguleren. Daarnaast waren 
de Nederlandse banken niet gewend om steun van de overheid te krijgen wanneer ze in de 
problemen raakten. Hoewel de Nederlandse overheid een aantal keer heeft ingegrepen tijdens 
de crisis van de jaren twintig, had zij dit nooit eerder gedaan. Toen de overheid ingreep, deed 
zij dit in het grootste geheim. De Nederlandse overheid begreep dat sommige banken te groot 
waren om om te vallen. Zij liet dit zien toen ze de grootste bank van Nederland van de 
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ondergang behoedde. Door de afwezigheid van een zogenoemd ‘laatste vangnet’ waren banken 
gedwongen om hun eigen problemen op te lossen. Er gingen echter nog steeds banken failliet, 
maar de kosten voor de samenleving van de crisis in de jaren twintig waren aanzienlijk lager 
dan de kosten die we in de meest recente crisis hebben moeten maken om onze banken te 
redden (Colvin et al., 2014). 
Als tweede zou ik willen aangeven, dat het bestuderen van economische geschiedenis 
ons inzichten kan geven in de evolutie van de besluitvormingsprocessen en de rol van 
bestuurders bij deze processen. In hoofdstuk drie laten we zien dat er in de twintigste eeuw een 
verandering te zien is in de importantie van bestuurders voor een onderneming. Recentelijk is 
er natuurlijk een debat ontstaan over de hoogte en de frequentie waarmee bestuurders bonussen 
betaald krijgen. Wanneer we naar het onderzoek kijken zien we dat onze bestuurders 
systematisch invloed hebben op de bedrijfsvoering en dat deze bestuurders vooral actief zijn in 
grote en zeer winstgevende ondernemingen. Daarnaast zie ik dat hun rol vooral na periodes 
van economische tegenslagen relatief belangrijk is. Zodoende vind ik dat de rol van prominente 
bestuurders bepaald wordt door hun netwerk en hoe centraal ze staan in de Nederlandse 
economie. Anders gezegd prominente bestuurders hebben exceptionele kwaliteiten.  
Als laatste wil ik noemen dat onze geschiedenis ons inspiratie kan geven. Historische 
voorbeelden bieden ons de mogelijkheid om hedendaagse kwesties in de 
bedrijfsfinancieringsleer op een nieuwe manier te benaderen. Hoofdstuk vier laat zien dat de 
financiële flexibiliteit van een onderneming belangrijk is voor de beslissing van bestuurders 
om de betaalde dividenden stabiel te houden. Ik heb dit idee gekregen door het feit dat 
ondernemingen slechts één doel hebben, dat is overleven. Een onderneming overleeft door 
risico’s op de balans te beperken (beschreven in hoofdstuk 2). In hoofdstuk drie hebben we 
gezien dat bestuurders actief bijdragen aan beleidsbeslissingen, zoals ook past bij de theorie 
van Lambrecht en Myers (2012). Zij beargumenteren dat bestuurders risico’s willen vermijden 
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en hun pensioenen en bonussen veilig willen stellen en zodoende de neiging hebben om 
dividenden te stabiliseren (beschreven in hoofdstuk 4). Wanneer we deze ideeën combineren 
met een van mijn projecten, niet opgenomen in dit proefschrift, over de lange termijn evolutie 
van dividendbeslissingen in Nederland, zien we dat alle eerder genoemde zaken de fundering 
vormen voor hoofdstuk vier.58 
Het punt dat ik hier wil maken is dat we bewust ons moeten zijn van de geschiedenis 
om zo het heden en de toekomst te kunnen doorgronden. Economische geschiedenis als 
vakgebied is aan het opkomen. De waarde van dit vakgebied voor academisch onderzoek en 
onderwijs kan enorm zijn. 
 
  
                                                          
58 De beschrijving van de lange termijn evolutie van dividendpolitiek in Nederland is een project met Abe de Jong en Henry van Beusichem 
(De Jong et al, 2014). 
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How firms, banks and board interact has a significant impact on corporate financing
decisions and performance. In three studies, this dissertation combines studies in economic
history with contemporary research in corporate finance. The first study investigate the
determinants of this bank distress in the Netherlands during the 1920s. During this period
the Dutch economy suffered an unequalled financial crisis. This study finds that during this
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policies. The results show that the directors with the highest systematic relevance for
corporate policies are not by definition those who are most central in the Dutch network.
Rather, these directors have substantial social capital and extensive management expe -
rience. The third study investigates the impact of corporate financial flexibility on dividend
smoothing practices. For large and mature firms dividend payment is still an important
determinant of access to capital markets. As investors aim to generate stable returns, these
firms have the incentive to smooth dividends. This study thus focuses on the interaction
between corporate capital structure choices and dividend smoothing practices. First, the
study documents that firms smooth their dividends more when they are more financially
flexible. Second, the examination shows that firms smooth their dividends more when
agency costs are high and that capital structure choices enable dividend smoothing. The
results  of these studies address different aspects and interactions between firms, banks,
their boards and shareholders.
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